



Reframing Non-Metropolitan Left Behind Places Through Mobility and Alternative Development

Innovative concepts

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Definition
COVID 19	Coronavirus disease 2019
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Indicator
LBAs	Left-behind Areas
LHDI	Local Human Development Indicator
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Re-Place	Reframing Non-Metropolitan Left Behind Places Through Mobility and Alternative Development
SMTaRA	Small and Mid-sized Towns and Rural Areas

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About the project

1. About the project

The Re-Place project is set to explore the complex issues faced by peripheral non-metropolitan areas, which have been the subject of mixed narratives during the COVID-19 pandemic. While some people see these areas as struggling and left behind, others see them as offering a higher quality of life compared to big cities. Both views point to the complexity in deciphering the role spatial mobilities play in the future of peripheral places traditionally victims of outward migration and a lack of investment in economic and social infrastructure. Re-Place will study the dual function of places as areas of origin and destination focusing on heterogeneous forms of dwelling enmeshed in place. The overall objective is to mobilize participative research in non-metropolitan left-behind areas (LBAs) to examine the impact that spatial (im)mobility has on origin and destination areas and how it can be harnessed to improve local alternative development, cooperative building of human capital, wellbeing and sustainability across contexts.

Focused on LBA's throughout six European countries, including Germany, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain, the Re-Place project strives i) to develop empirical tools – namely a typology and an online representative population survey- to advance complex understandings of development pathways and mobility; ii) to scale down to 12 areas in 6 countries to examine the (im)mobility drivers and movement to and from different types of LBAs assessing ensuing spatial, economic, social, and cultural transformations; iii) to qualitatively examine perceptions and livelihood practices of (im)mobile residents across life domains to understand micro strategies of dealing with peripherality; iv) to co-create place- based policies to enhance mobility benefits and alternative local development through village living labs and the development of a policy toolbox; and v) to reframe existing narratives on LBAs to reinforce a sense of place for residents and newcomers using co-production and visual methodologies.

Partners:

	Short name	Legal name	Country
1	IGOT UL	INSTITUTO DE GEOGRAFIA E ORDENAMENTO DO TERRITORIO DA UNIVERSIDADE DELISBOA	PT
2	UNI BA	OTTO-FRIEDRICH-UNIVERSITAET BAMBERG	DE
3	UNIROMA1	UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI ROMA LA SAPIENZA	IT
4	LU	LATVIJAS UNIVERSITATE	LV
5	ICCV	INSTITUTUL DE CERCETARE A CALITATII VIETII	RO
6	ULPGC	UNIVERSITY OF LAS PALMAS DE GRAN CANARIA	ES
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7	SPI	SOCIEDADE PORTUGUESA DE INOVACAO - CONSULTADORIA EMPRESARIAL E FOMENTO DA INOVACAO SA	PT

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Executive summary

2. Executive Summary

Jennifer McGarrigle

Regional inequality is a long-term policy concern within the EU. However, 'left-behindness' gained traction in public and political discourse in response to the heightened social and spatial inequalities after the 2008 economic and financial crisis. 'Left-behind' as an analytical term and spatial imaginary relates to the emergence of populism and hotspots of discontent in places in decline. In parts of Europe and further afield anti-immigration or anti-EU integration support has risen in response to feelings of disenchantment among local communities. On the other hand, spatial mobilities have been imbued with optimism as a possible panacea to the emptying of places. This hope was rekindled with the COVID-19 pandemic and the surge in remote work, education, and digital citizenship, which accelerated new lifestyle patterns. Expectations intensified that new spatial mobilities might help to revitalise Small and Mid-sized Towns and Rural Areas (SMTaRA) to reverse outward migration, a lack of economic investment, diminishing social infrastructure and, in some cases, political and public stigmatization.

The way in which local communities respond to these challenges will have a huge impact in terms of future local development, community wellbeing and sustainability. Re-Place aims to move beyond 'left-behind' discourses and co-produce knowledge and policy that taps into local resources, capacities and diversities to increase wellbeing and quality of life for all residents. By decentering the focus from metropolitan centres, we hope to fill knowledge gaps on the impacts of spatial mobility – in terms of local employment, welfare, culture and community – and its development potential in different types of 'left behind' places.

This working paper provides our research agenda and a conceptual "compass" for the research team involved in Re-Place. Moreover, we hope to stimulate dialogue with fellow scholars, as well as policymakers and practitioners. The working paper will present Re-Place's place-based mobility lens as an alternative epistemological approach to study how diverse (im)mobilities, linking different scales, can cumulatively contribute to place-making and different local development outcomes in non-metropolitan LBAs, or in places facing similar challenges.

The first part of the working paper presents a transdisciplinary review of the literature (section 4) along four analytical dimensions: 1) the geographical dimension, interrogates 'left-behind' as an analytical term, label and a spatial imaginary; 2) the mobility dimension, draws potential insights from classical migration theory, transnationalism, the mobilities paradigm and immobility; 3) the socio-economic dimension, revisits the migration development-nexus and place-based social capital to frame the debate on neo-endogenous development; and 4) the psycho-social dimension, sheds light on the role of place attachment and narratives of belonging in mobility and migration decision making and as an integral part in neo-endogenous development.

The second part of the paper "Re-Places" the state of the art (section 5) and presents our innovative research approach and methods. This is grounded on a place-based lens through which we study the relationship between left-behind areas, mobility, and local development from a well-being framework. Intersectional forms of knowledge and critical knowledge on masculinities is transversal across our conceptual framework and research agenda.

In line with this, the first section (5.1) asks how we can move beyond the notion of peripheral mobilities and contribute to the current 'left behind' policy agenda. The impacts of spatial mobilities are not neatly

classified by the migration categories often employed in policy and academia but cumulatively contribute to transforming the socio-economic fabric, cultural landscape and physical environment of places. We conceptualize mobility to non-metro, peripheral or remote areas through the lens of spatial mobilities, focusing on the interconnectedness of different forms of mobility and evolving forms of dwelling that re-configure place and its positioning within different scales of power. Applying a place-mobility lens to the neo-endogenous model of development will interrogate the potential of spatial mobilities in development pathways.

The second section (5.2) builds on the well-established beyond GDP agenda and the alternative development agenda (Stiglitz et al. 2018; MacKinnon et al. 2021; Wirth et al. 2016). In response to the challenge presented by both agendas to move beyond the “hard infrastructures” or classical measures of economic performance, we conceptualise local areas as “community capital structures” (Sandu et al, 2023: 12). A Local Human Development Indicator (LHDI) operationalises this through the inclusion of three types of assets or capital – economic-material, human capital and health – and we attend to the emotional dimension through a national survey on how different types of (im)mobile individuals feel about the place they live in terms of place identity, attachment and wellbeing.

The third section (5.3) presents wellbeing as a “demigrantised” perspective on integration and discusses how we will operationalise this from a methodological perspective. The core premise of the research framework prioritizes well-being over integration as an innovative approach that inclusively addresses the needs of all population groups. By shifting focus towards quality of life, this framework extends beyond the confines of migrant exclusivity (and migrant integration policy), to embrace the integrated experiences of new and ‘old’ inhabitants alike. Responding to these questions, we present our reflexive methodological design that draws upon qualitative methods in 12 LBAs across the six Re-Place countries.

The final section (5.4) presents the Re-Place methodological toolbox to harness local expertise among diverse residents to co-create place-based policies to enhance mobility benefits and alternative local development. We will draw on the lived knowledge, expertise, practice, diversities and capabilities of (im)mobile residents through participatory methods in the form of Village Labs to co-produce a policy toolbox. Reframing sensationalist representations of ‘left-behindness’, we will work and learn with LBA residents to foreground their (im)mobility experiences, livelihood strategies and micro-tactics for dealing with peripherality and decline. Digital ethnography and the curation of visuals will be used as a multisensory tool to produce new narratives and depictions from below. Throughout the deliverable, boxes have been included to highlight Re-Place’s working definitions tailored to different audiences.

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Introduction

3. Introduction

Jennifer McGarrigle

Peripheral non-metropolitan areas have recently become focal points of different narratives. One narrative, marked with pessimism, relates to the emergence of populism and hotspots of discontent in certain parts of Europe. Here, local communities feel 'left-behind' giving traction to anti-system, anti-immigration or anti-EU integration sentiments. The prolonged detachment of these regions from major urban centres, alongside demographic decline, has led to deepening social and economic disparities (Sandbu, 2020; De Ruyter et al., 2021), signalling a shift from the post-war model of egalitarian capitalism in the 1970s (Hopkin, 2020). On the other hand, notwithstanding intensified inequalities, an optimistic perspective has emerged in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the soaring cost of life in cities. Hopeful collective visions have been rekindled of smaller cities and rural areas as havens that offer an enhanced quality of life and environment compared to metropolitan hubs. The surge in remote work, education, and digital citizenship has accelerated new lifestyle patterns, intensifying expectations that new spatial mobilities might help to stave off outward migration and population decline (Goodwin-Hawkins & Dafydd Jones, 2021; Dominguez-Mujica et al. 2021). Spatial inequalities can render such ways of life viable through geoarbitrage and increasing material affordability, and perceptions of places can provide aspirational lifestyles for middle-class movers, or lifestyle and retirement migrants (ibid; Benson & O'Reilly, 2016; McGarrigle, 2022). Both views point to the complexity involved in deciphering the role mobility plays in the future of peripheral places that have traditionally suffered from outward migration, a lack of economic investment, diminishing social infrastructure and in some cases political and public stigmatization.

At the policy level, there is a disparity between intra-EU mobility policies, which often facilitate the departure and subsequent loss of human capital, and cohesion policies, which strive to mitigate spatial inequalities. Re-Place addresses this disparity by shifting its focus away from metropolitan centres to bridge knowledge gaps regarding the impacts and development potential of spatial mobility in LBAs, or in regions facing similar challenges such as non-metropolitan areas, shrinking areas, Small and Mid-sized Towns and Rural Areas (SMTaRA), peripheral areas, border zones, and the like. Rather than perpetuating narratives of abandonment, Re-Place seeks to collaboratively generate knowledge and policies that leverage local resources, capabilities, and diversities to enhance the well-being and quality of life for all inhabitants.

Re-Place works from the hypothesis that different stages of development in the "life" of Left Behind Areas (LBAs) or their relative positions within development latitudes may well be linked to different types of mobility, with both elements reciprocally affecting each other. This means some areas may only be places of departure and eventual return. Other areas might "repel" certain individuals, due to lack of opportunities or the potential for social mobility, and concurrently also attract newcomers from: a) lower latitudes in the spatial division of labour in search of work in lower skilled positions; and/or b) higher latitudes in search of

a higher quality yet lower cost of life in terms of services, housing and environment. The diverse mobility drivers imply that the mobility impacts will too be diverse, potentially creating tensions between labour conditions, welfare and housing access, and socio-cultural practices, which may serve to exacerbate existing inequalities and impact the quality of life of long-term stayers and movers. The intersection between mobility types and impacts necessitates an integrated place-based approach rather than an immigration lens to promote a holistic understanding of community wellbeing and place making.

This working paper aims to illustrate this place-based mobility lens as an alternative epistemological approach to study how diverse (im)mobilities linking different scales can cumulatively contribute to place-making and different local development outcomes in non-metropolitan LBAs, or in regions facing similar challenges.

The first part of the working paper presents a transdisciplinary review of the literature (section 4). The first section (4.1), on the *geographical dimension*, interrogates 'left-behind' as an analytical term, label and a spatial imaginary. It defines the debate on LBAs in terms of emerging geographies of discontent, the development of a new agenda to approach socio-spatial inequalities, the characterisation and classification of LBAs, and the lesser studied issue of the impacts of exit and migration to LBAs. The second section (4.2), on the *mobility dimension*, draws potential insights from classical migration theory, transnationalism, the mobilities paradigm and immobility. Mobility and immobility are conceived as interconnected providing more nuanced understanding of mobility patterns and their implications for community-based development in LBAs. Following this, the third section (4.3), focussing on the *socio-economic dimension*, revisits the migration development-nexus and place-based social capital to frame the debate on neo-endogenous development. Finally, the fourth section (4.4), presenting the *psycho-social dimension*, sheds light on the role of place attachment and narratives of belonging in mobility and migration decision making. The importance of the spaces where we live for our personal and social identity is well documented in environmental psychology (Hernandez, Hidalgo, Salazar-Laplace & Hess, 2007) and is an integral part in understanding the affective turn in the 'left-behind' research agenda.

The second part of the paper "Re-Places" the state of the art (section 5) and presents our innovative research approach. This is grounded on a place-based lens through which we study the relationship between left-behind areas, mobility, and local development from a well-being framework. Intersectional forms of knowledge and critical knowledge on masculinities is transversal across our conceptual framework and research agenda.

In line with this, the first section (5.1) asks how we can move beyond the notion of peripheral mobilities and contribute to the current 'left behind' policy agenda. We conceptualize mobility to non-metro, peripheral or remote areas through the lens of spatial mobilities, which includes physical, social, virtual, and imaginative mobilities. This focuses on the interconnectedness of different forms of mobility and evolving forms of

dwelling that re-configure place and its positioning within different scales of power. Understanding the impact of mobility on places, the translocal relationships this creates and its potential for development is not a new question. However, overcoming the material and emotional dimensions of “left behind-ness” through viable policies to counter spatial disparities and growing discontent is a challenge. We will *examine the (im)mobility drivers and perpetuation of movement to and from different types of LBAs as well as assessing ensuing spatial, economic, social, and cultural transformations* (Objective 2). Applying a place-mobility lens to the neo-endogenous model of development will interrogate the potential of spatial mobilities in development pathways by asking if new mobilities: contribute to social innovation; diversify commercial offer/businesses/cultural activities; contribute to a context of cultural diversity which could, in turn, attract more people, investment and valorise the local community and place identity? Or, to the contrary, do they: polarise the social fabric; generate problems in terms of political representativeness; negatively impact the formation of cultural and political values and community formation/ local solidarities necessary for addressing practical problems? Do outward mobilities lead to a weakening of place attachment or transactions of care? As such, we interrogate existing policies on LBAs and discuss the power of co-creation in developing effective place-based policies across different LBA contexts.

The second section (5.2) builds on the well-established beyond GDP agenda and the alternative development agenda (Stiglitz et al. 2018; MacKinnon et al. 2021; Wirth et al. 2016). Our goal is *to develop empirical and conceptual tools to advance more complex understandings of development pathways and mobility in areas classed as left behind* (objective 1). In response to the challenge presented by both agendas to move beyond the “hard infrastructures” or classical measures of economic performance, we conceptualise local areas as “community capital structures” (Sandu et al, 2023: 12). A Local Human Development Indicator (LHDI) operationalises this through the inclusion of three types of assets or capital – economic-material, human capital and health –providing a measure at the local rather than national or regional level. While the LHDI will shed light on community capital in relation to broader patterns of regional development, we examine the emotional dimension through a national survey on how different types of (im)mobile individuals *feel* about the place they live in terms of place identity, attachment and wellbeing. Thus, attending to the renewed focus on strengthening place attachment, wellbeing, and mobility in “cultivating” local development.

The third section (5.3) presents wellbeing as a “demigrantised” perspective on integration and discusses how we will operationalise this from a methodological perspective. The core premise of the research framework prioritizes well-being over integration as an innovative approach that inclusively addresses the needs of all population groups. By shifting focus towards quality of life, this framework extends beyond the confines of migrant exclusivity (and migrant integration policy), to embrace the integrated experiences of new and ‘old’ inhabitants alike. As such, we *will examine the perceptions and livelihood practices of (im)mobile local residents across life domains and localities to understand micro strategies of dealing with*

peripherality and place-making (objective 3). Naturally, this poses challenges: How do we generate fresh insights into the impacts of mobility without being constrained by predetermined categories that could hinder our understanding of both individual and collective experiences? How can we construct meaningful categories and concepts in our analysis that actively interrogate rather than perpetuate the migration apparatus? In adopting a lens of well-being rather than integration, how do we avoid overlooking the various frames of social injustice that migrants encounter? Responding to these questions, we present our reflexive methodological design that draws upon qualitative methods in 12 LBAs across the six Re-Place countries.

The final section (5.4) presents the Re-Place methodological toolbox to engage local actors in the *co-creation of place-based policies to enhance mobility benefits and alternative local development* (objective 4). The central tenet of alternative local development is drawing on lived knowledge, expertise, practice, diversities and capabilities. Complementing more traditional research methods, such as interviews, participatory methods will be employed through Village Labs that will contribute to the co-production of a policy toolbox. Moreover, narratives of 'left-behindness' are often shaped by sensationalist representations from above that tend to homogenise social and cultural landscapes that are deemed as powerless. However, we aim to *reframe existing narratives on left behind places and new mobilities to reinforce a sense of place for residents and potential newcomers* (objective 5). Attempting to avoid epistemic privilege, we will work and learn with LBA residents to foreground their (im)mobility experiences, livelihood strategies and micro-tactics for dealing with peripherality. By focusing on locations and stories that resist telling we hope to avoid the reproduction of existing narratives and vulnerabilities. The curation of visuals will be used as a multisensory tool to produce new narratives and depictions from below.

4

**Transdisciplinary
review of the literature:
relevant studies and
what we know so far**

4. Transdisciplinary review of the literature: relevant studies and what we know so far

4.1 Geographical dimension: The research agenda on 'left-behind' areas

4.1.1 Defining the debate on 'left-behind' areas

Jennifer McGarrigle

While concern with regional inequalities has been long-standing in national and EU policy, 'left-behindness' gained traction in public and political discourse in response to the heightened social and spatial inequalities after the 2008 economic and financial crisis (Jones, 2024). The label 'left-behind' is at times elusive but is most widely used in relation to former industrial or rural places that have lost out in processes of economic and technological change under globalization (Pike et al. 2023). We adopt the definition presented by Velthuis et al. (2023: 3) of 'left behind places' as:

places experiencing decline or stagnation on economic, demographic and social dimensions, relative to more dynamic and prosperous places. 'Left-behindness' can therefore be understood as a multidimensional condition that affects a wide variety of places, ranging from deindustrialised cities to more peripheral and rural regions.

So-called 'left-behind' places face the dual challenges associated with high levels of deprivation, unemployment and low productivity as well as declining community, civic assets, social infrastructure and cultural production (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018, Moralli et al., 2023). In the context of de-industrialization, declining agricultural economies, digitalization and residential capitalism, certain people and places have become increasingly disconnected from the spatial centres of the global economy (De Ruyter et al. 2021). Indeed, MacKinnon et al (2022: 41) argue that the production of 'left-behind' places is intrinsically embedded in the "relational processes of metropolitanization" as the skilled economy is ever more concentrated in cities or even "superstar cities" (Feldman et al, 2021). Alternatively, Landau (2018) contests the dichotomy of centre and periphery, rather suggesting that capital and people are attracted by urban islands, on which the hinterland is dependent and related. Also, other scholars argue that the relationships between growth in the core metropolitan hubs and shrinking spaces are interdependent representing a specific development in the landscape of contemporary capitalism, not separate phenomenon (Dzenovska, 2020). Dzenovska (2020) introduces the notion "emptiness" to conceptualise and visualise depopulation and shrinkage processes as an omnipresent phenomenon, an observable reality. Emptiness is materially present in abandoned buildings and infrastructure, as well as linked to lifestyles and social practices that are developed as places lose their constitutive elements (Dzenovska, 2020).

Geographies of discontent. These protracted and intensified inequalities have given rise to feelings of disenchantment reflected in support for anti-system parties and in new “geographies of discontent” (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2023). In recent years, this has been seen in electoral geographies in Europe, the Americas and beyond, whereby peripheral places are giving voice to grievances and political marginalization through their support for populist parties (Ulrich-Schad & Duncan, 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Dijkstra et al., 2020; McKay et al., 2023).

Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2023) identify two main perspectives in the literature that put forth explanations for the rise in geographies of discontent. The first is the “cultural backlash theory” proposed by Norris and Inglehart (2019). They argue that the large-scale shift toward post-materialism and libertarian values is due to three main drivers: the marked growth in the proportion of younger cohorts with university education, the mobility of higher educated individuals toward knowledge agglomerations and the fact that Western countries have become increasingly diverse. They argue that this has produced counter-reactions among older social conservatives overrepresented in white rural communities in economic decline. As social conservatives have gone from being a numeric majority to minority, they increasingly feel that they are ‘strangers in their own land’ (Hochschild, 2016). This creates a tipping point that prompts populist authoritarian sensibilities. Thus, the rise in cultural liberalism, on the one hand, and authoritarianism, on the other, leads to a decline in support for mainstream parties and a growth in the political extremes. Criticisms of the cultural backlash theory are manifold. Schäfer (2022) argues that evidence of polarization between older and younger voters at the authoritarian–libertarian extremes is weak, at best, and represents differences in degree rather than being oppositional. Most importantly, the same author questions the links between the growth in populism and generational change concluding that, “Older cohorts are more likely to hold somewhat less culturally liberal values, *but* they are not more likely to endorse populist values and are actually less likely to vote for populist or authoritarian-populist parties” (Schäfer, 2022: 1978, own emphasis). The second explanation for the rise in geographies of discontent is economic, linking anti-system party success with the decline of formerly successful places (Becker, Fetzner & Novy, 2017) where people feel relatively deprived and ignored by the political elite (McKay et al., 2023). Shortfalls in representation, social degradation and economic deterioration creates vulnerabilities in certain areas and susceptibility to populist politics (Bolet, 2021; Carreras et al., 2019; McKay et al., 2023; Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2023). Despite these different perspectives, most scholars concede that economic and cultural explanations do not preclude each other (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018).

On this note, an important aspect addressed by recent studies is the multidimensional and diverse nature of geographies of discontent. Studies have connected the geography of discontent with many contextual and individual factors of a social, economic and political nature. In a recent study, Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2023) found a strong link between areas stuck in a development trap and support for both extreme and moderate Eurosceptic parties. Moreover, the connection increases with length and intensity of stagnation.

Other studies, such as Dijkstra et al. (2020), have found that long-term economic and industrial decline is a greater determinant of votes than demographic and employment decline. As such, relatively wealthy residents of declining areas who have been better-off in the past are more likely to vote for Eurosceptic parties rather than poor people in poor areas. Considering strength of opposition to EU integration, shows that variables often assumed to be predictors of populism, “such as ageing, rurality, remoteness, employment decline and population decline – seem to matter much less or matter in different ways” (Dijkstra et al., 2020: 737). Analysing the connections between geographies of discontent and perceptions of government bias toward particular places, McKay et al., (2023) show that the strongest predictors are lack of trust in government, populist attitudes (but not identifying with a populist party) and living in *non*-deprived rural and peripheral areas. Curiously, they find that left-wing ideology is a strong predictor of perceived government biases toward particular areas leading them to argue that “the argument against neglected places is not ‘owned’ by populists” (McKay et al., 2023: 24). Albeit Rodríguez-Pose and Dijkstra (2021) find that areas who are destinations of Cohesion Policy investment are less likely to support anti-EU parties.

A more complex picture of geographies of discontent emerges from the literature, which contests the simple formula of low-income, demographically declining regions as being the locus of geographic resentment. Moreover, De Ruyter et al. (2021) argue, drawing on Hirschman’s (1970) ‘Exit-Voice-Loyalty’ model, that people express their discontent in different ways. ‘Voice’ can vary between voting to informal expressions of protest or dialogues on social media or in public spaces with the intention to instigate change seen for instance in the immobile population voting for Brexit in LBAs (Lee et al., 2018). On the other hand, ‘exit’ is the act of escaping a situation that is not satisfying, an aspect that will be explored later on in this section.

Identifying and classifying LBAs. In the burgeoning literature on LBAs, there is a clear consensus on the multidimensionality of ‘left-behindness’ evident in the different ways it manifests across contexts (Velthuis et al. 2023b). The key identifying features can be summarised as the following: economic disadvantage (under-performance and decline), limited job opportunities/ below average employment, pay and productivity, lower qualifications (education and skills); higher than average levels of poverty, social and cultural marginalization, political neglect/ disengagement, reductions in public service provision/ investment, out-migration, ageing, demographic shrinkage, lower health outcomes, poor connectivity, lack of community facilities and assets (Tomaney et al. 2021; MacKinnon et al., 2021). These features are not always present and as Pike et al. (2023: 5) write “...particular configurations of ‘left-behind’ conditions vary and change over time and space requiring consideration of their causation, geography, and temporality”.

As stated previously, the left behind spatial imaginary refers to multiple geographies as attested to by the diversity of territories in recent studies, including in the global south (Tups et al., 2023). However, fewer studies have attempted to typify the diversity within the 'left-behind' label in a systematic way. In a recent project, "Beyond 'Left-behind Places'"¹, Velthuis et al. (2023b) develop a regional typology with six types, three of which are reclassified as 'left-behind'. The cluster analysis undertaken for NUTS3 regions in EU15 includes variables representing economic development as well as social and demographic factors. The 3 'left-behind' clusters are defined by: 1) economic decline and deindustrialization; 2) demographic decline and ageing; and 3) disconnected and high poverty. These are regions with comparatively lower levels of economic development and growth, lower than national average levels of job and population growth, lower rates of net migration and higher rates of poverty. However, perhaps most important are the differences between these clusters. The last two clusters suffer mostly from demographic decline, while the economic and industrial decline suffered by the first cluster is not coupled with population loss. Not all 'left-behind' regions are affected by a lack of infrastructure or accessibility to key services, which is only the case in the last cluster. Moreover, average levels of household poverty varied between the clusters demonstrating that poor living conditions are not obligatorily related with 'left-behindness'. There are also temporal and trajectorial differences between clusters as the first cluster defined by economic decline and industrialization deteriorated from a level of economic development close to the national average, while the others are characterized by very long-term stagnation and population shrinkage. Even though all three types of 'left-behind' regions were found across all EU15 countries, there were prevalent types in different nations showing the importance of the national context. For Re-Place countries, in Germany the most predominant was the cluster denoting demographic decline and aging. The cluster denoting disconnected and high poverty is most prevalent in Southern European countries – a fifth of Spanish regions, almost a third of Italian regions most part in the south and three-quarters of Portuguese regions (see Velthuis et al. 2023a: 11). The economic decline and deindustrialization cluster is the dominant type in Spain and represents a significant number of regions in Portugal. The same study also has interesting results on the nature of structural economic change (Velthuis et al. 2022). 'Left-behindness' is not only characterized by industrial decline and large-scale industrial job loss, but other sectoral compositions are also disadvantageous namely regions that have high growth in low-wage and low productivity sectors including hospitality or an overrepresentation of public sector employment. While statistically speaking this is correct, the latter is not a cause of 'left-behindness' and may even be an attempt to create local public employment and services to stave off out-mobility. 'Left-behindness' also manifests on different scales (Velthuis et al., 2023a: 2-3). Geographical inequalities determined by poverty produces socially fragmented territorial patterns evident at the level of neighbourhood (Tierney et al., 2023). As such, even wealthy regions may host neighbourhoods that display 'left-behind' traits (Velthuis et al., 2023a). Other wider processes of economic restructuring are apparent at higher spatial scales, typically at the regional level. The interaction of processes operating across scales points to the need for a multi-scalar approach that enables us to

understand the both the regional and local contexts in which development pathways emerge. Moreover, the role of transnational connections is important in understand multi-local livelihood practices, social networks and potential remittances that might contribute to development, place-making and resilience in LBAs.

Table 1. The analytical dimensions of studying LBAs

Dimensions	Indicators	Governance	Scale
Environmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical environment Risks (fires/ heating/ floods) Air quality 	Macro: National	Supranational/ National
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Representative democracy Political extremes (populism, nationalism) Trust in authorities Voice 	Regional	
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Productivity Incomes Sectoral composition Training Wealth Livelihood Social economy Housing 	Local	Regional
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social mobility/ capital Civic participation Networks Wellbeing Social innovation family ties; intergenerational income mobility 	Meso level:	
Cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Openness Diversity Attitudes and values Patrimony/heritage 	Grassroots/civic initiatives/ communities	Local

<p>Mobility</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural production • Spatial mobility • Internal/ residential • Digital • Migration • Exit • Return • Circular mobility 	<p>Micro:</p>	<p>Neighbourhood</p>
<p>Psychological</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emotions • Belonging and attachment • Place identity 	<p>Individuals and households</p>	

Sources: adapted from Pike et al. (2023) and MacKinnon et al. (2021)

Traditional policy agendas. Peripheralization, that is, long economic decay, demographic shrinking and ensuing spatial inequalities (Leibert & Golinski, 2016), presents the symptoms at the core of regional policy. Yet, it has become increasingly clear that market-orientated development strategies in left-behind or peripheral areas have failed, pushing dominant regional development theories into a crisis (Hadjimichalis & Hudson, 2014). Wirth et al. (2016: 63) argue that the periphery is not well provided for by mainstream regional policy as it is seen as the “laggard in the competition with urban areas that it can never win”. The economic parameters used to evaluate the development of peripheral areas have “marginalized these places as underperforming, condemning them to either playing an often-unrealistic game of ‘catch-up’ or to a future of managed decline (Pike et al. 2016)” (MacKinnon et al. 2022: 6). MacKinnon et al. (2022: 43) argue that there has been a sole focus on productivity as a narrow representation of the economy and on the tradable competitive sectors rather than on lower value-added sectors (social care, hospitality, leisure, public services and retail) that represent the majority of employment in regions that are lagging. Moreover, cities have been the locus for territorial innovation rather than declining territories in the context of a shift from redistributive policies to those bolstering agglomeration economies in competitive city regions. The very logics of city competitiveness inherent in entrepreneurial urbanism has had continuity in the agglomeration logics of the knowledge economy (Glaser, 2011; MacKinnon et al. 2022). As MacKinnon et al. (2022) and Pike et al. (2023) rightly argue, this leads to mobility incentives for individuals towards better off areas leading to further decline in lagging regions and inequality in access to mobility for less well-off people. While regional development theories have been called into question, so have the cultural politics surrounding “levelling up” policies in the UK or “no place left-behind” in the US (Jones, 2024). The power of ‘left-behind’ sloganism in homogenising or

implementing top-down solutions may itself be stigmatizing. In the words of Jones (2024: 8), “the ‘left-behind’ are often caricatures that ease nuance and complexity within both class and regional identity, and which develop because they are useful politically” being “constructed from above”, rather than, “self-representation from below”.

In answer to this critical stance, scholars also point to the agency within communities and forms of democratic localism (Jones, 2024). Much can be learnt from long-standing beyond GDP models of development, as discussed in section 5.2. In the case of LBAs, MacKinnon et al. (2022) point to the foundational economy which privileges investing in the infrastructures that make everyday life civilised rather than only tradable sectors. Central to this are incomes and livelihoods – focussing on what people do to get by, rather than productivity –, social innovation and social infrastructures as a basis for well-being and quality of life. However, other approaches based on post-growth perspectives (Jackson, 2021) provide useful insights: The Wellbeing Economy/ posits that material growth is detrimental to ecological and human wellbeing (in terms of social cohesion and psychological and physical wellness) (Fioramonti et al. 2022); or Community Wealth Building argues for a model based on bottom-up growth in local communities, local/worker ownership and socially productive uses of land and assets (Crisp et al., 2023).

A new approach to spatial inequalities. As a concept, a spatial imaginary and an analytical term, ‘left-behindness’ is malleable and encompassing of a multitude of geographies (MacKinnon et al., 2022; Pike et al., 2023). As such, recent work has tried to provide conceptual clarity by focusing on its contribution to existing approaches on geographical inequalities. Pike et al. (2023) trace the ‘left-behind’ label through a “geographical etymology”. They argue that it is useful in its purpose to “recover a more relational and agency-sensitive understanding of geographically uneven development” (p2). To unpack this further, *relational* refers to the contextualization of the decline of particular places within wider processes of metropolitanization and peripheralization and the idea that ‘left-behindness’ does not occur within a political vacuum. Jones (2024) contends that narratives shaping the geography of discontent fail to recognize that regional spatial inequalities are consequences of political choices that have devastated economic and cultural landscapes over the past 20 to 30 years. To overcome narrow, top-down, one- sized fits all development agendas, the ‘left-behind’ research agenda complexifies the narrow aperture that the economic lens provides of development to shed light on the contribution of multiple dimensions in social, cultural, political and environmental terms. An *agency-sensitive* understanding of ‘left-behindness’ recognizes that policies to forge spatial justice are more likely to be effective if actually existing local knowledge and capital is harnessed alongside economically driven interventions (Pike et al., 2023).

The affective turn. The “affective turn” in the ‘left-behind’ research agenda therefore reframes developments beyond mere economic considerations. It builds upon the multi-dimensionality of the concept of ‘left-behind places’ to focus on belonging, place attachment and social infrastructures as

shaping wellbeing and welfare (Tomaney et al. 2013; MacKinnon et al. 2023). The decline, stagnation or long-term disconnection of a place not only impacts individuals' relationships with the market, but it has repercussions on their sense belonging, in social and political terms, to the local community or place of residence. As such, recent studies have foregrounded the importance of place attachment and belonging in understanding the feeling of 'left behindness'. In particular, the threat that long-term economic and social decline has on feelings of belonging and place attachment has been studied in relation to declining social infrastructure. Klinenberg defines social infrastructure as 'the physical places and organisations that shape the way people interact' including all manner of public spaces that "draw people into the public realm" or "community facilities and meeting places to foster reconnection, reduce isolation and create spaces for conviviality" (2019: 5 in MacKinnon et al., 2021: 50 and Tomaney et al, 2023: 1). Social infrastructure refers to the soft services that provide care, education, housing, etc. in opposition to hard infrastructures of transport, telecommunications and energy (MacKinnon et al., 2021). In the words of Tomaney et al. (2023: 1) social infrastructure takes,

“...a range of forms, but its purpose is to provide opportunities for gathering, sociality and the formation of attachments, creating spaces for differences to be aired civilly, disputes resolved and collective action agreed upon.”

Focusing mainly on 'left-behind' areas that have experienced industrial decline, studies have shown that as industries closed so did meeting places, pubs, trade unions, civic organizations. Belonging is therefore threatened by the double loss of jobs and professions and social membership. One such example are the links between the closure of local social hubs, such as pubs, and the loss of community and cultural identity, which Bolet et al. (2021) found ultimately translated into a higher level of association with UKIP in the UK. Similarly, the OCSI (2019) report found a relationship between the leave vote in the UK and the community needs index and a much stronger correlation with deprivation. This points to the importance of community engagement and civic assets. Tomaney et al. (2023) provide an in-depth case study of a County Durham mining village in the UK, considering how social infrastructure is "made, unmade and remade". They take a historical approach demonstrating the making of social infrastructure, mostly through religious institutions, at the end of the 1800s and beginning of the 1900s. Decline was evident as early as the post-Second World War period as welfare and local government became centralised alongside shifts in gender norms and new work patterns. This was exacerbated with the closure of the mine, in 1985, and, again later, in 2008, with the advent of austerity policy. The authors depict the emotional trauma of declining social infrastructure, disruption of place attachment and community belonging through Fullilove's idea of 'root shock', meaning 'the traumatic stress reaction to the destruction of all or parts of one's emotional ecosystem' (Fullilove, 2016: 11 in Tomaney et al., 2023: 3). Focusing on the affective dimension deepens our understanding of the impact of economic decline as it factors in the trauma that results from the "end of a way of life" on wellbeing.

The affective turn reinforces not only the importance of collective emotion in understanding development pathways but how this develops over time. In their study of East Thuringia in Germany, Hannemann et al. (2023) argue that feelings of collective embitterment, which fuel the “revenge of places that don’t matter” do not emerge suddenly but develop overtime in relation to what they term a trigger event akin to a “root shock”. Collective emotions either negative, like embitterment, or positive, such as hope, exist when people have a shared identity and interact socially. The authors interpret this concept from psychology through a regional lens arguing that collective emotions are both shaped by changing regional-specific characteristics as well as affecting regional identities and belonging. Hannemann et al. (2023: 9) argue that collective regional embitterment develops over a medium-term period as a “self-reinforcing process” prior to becoming evident, for example, through right-wing votes. As such, the emotional state of a population represents a significant element of place-based politics. Monitoring regional moods before weakened social cohesion or negative discourses become engrained provides the opportunity to promote positive narratives and social diversity (Hannemann et al., 2023).

LBAs and mobility. One of the major defining characteristics of LBAs is outmigration and depopulation (Velthuis et al., 2023b; Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2021). Yet, in the literature on LBAs there is less known about the impact of *exit* – whether on local communities or outgoing individuals – or of incoming mobilities. Building on the migration-development nexus, there is some hope that inward mobility might provide vitality in economic, social and demographic terms to LBAs. However, outmigration from remote or depopulated places does not seem to have positively contributed to development through investment, remittances or return (Zoomers, 2023). With the exception of related work on “new immigration destinations”, namely “less-popular” or “unlikely” destinations (McAreevy, 2017: 8), it is only quite recently that some light has been shed on migration to ‘left-behind’, remote or disinvested places.

Results emerging from the Horizon2020 funded IMAJINE project shed light on lifestyle migration to LBAs in Wales (Goodwin-Hawkins & Dafydd Jones, 2021) and on the west coast of Ireland (Goodwin-Hawkins et al., 2022). Moving down the economic escalator was a way to “enact middleclass lifestyles affordably” (Goodwin-Hawkins & Dafydd Jones, 2021: 1). Movers had lower than average incomes offset by lower living costs, which produced relative material affordability enabled by spatial inequality. Interestingly, the authors found that many of their interlocutors did not move for lifestyle reasons *per se*, but rather for relational connections becoming subjectively ‘enchanted’ by lifestyle post-migration. These “lifestyle stayers” were therefore retained by lifestyle factors – perceiving West Wales as cleaner, less stressful, more affordable and slower than London. Despite the fact that spatial inequalities produce relative affordability (income differentials and housing markets), elsewhere Goodwin-Hawkins et al. (2022), show that this may be counterbalanced in some cases by what they term the “rural penalty” as weaker service provision to rural or peripheral areas may perpetuate spatial inequalities (2022: 12). As such, redistribution of talent is not a catalyst for structural change. Understanding motivations, spatial inequalities, career

trade-offs and subjective enchantment with rural or remote places is important, but to what extent do newcomers in these areas contribute to revitalization?

The Welcoming Spaces² project's results shed some light on the previous question (Moralli et al., 2023). The project focuses on the hosting of non-EU migrants in remote areas in decline in response to the Long-term Vision for Rural Areas initiative (European Commission, 2021). 'Left-behind' remote areas contrary to the idea that they are hotbeds of populist votes some also, while of course not all, emerge as welcoming spaces for non-EU migrants (Zoomers, 2023, Darling, 2020). In a Southern Italian case study, the presence of non-EU migrants in a shrinking area led to revitalization and the reactivation of collective and public services (Lomonaco, et al., 2023). While this might seem like an answer to two policy problems that of regional development and migrant reception, turning 'left behind' areas into places of reception is not enough given problems with maintaining livelihoods and access to education, seen for example in the case of Canada as retention of migrants is poor (Kelly, 2023). Zoomers (2023) argues that resource redistribution, people-based investment and developing translocal links through new solidarities are key. It is to the latter and urban-rural relationality that we move to next.

4.1.2 Embedding 'left-behindness' in urban-rural legacies

Astrid Safina and Mário Vale

To address the complexity of left-behind places, it is also necessary to address the multiple frameworks through which it can be tackled. Specifically, regarding left-behindness and its relation to urban-rural relations, peripherality, and marginality.

Regarding **urban-rural relations**, left-behind places can be addressed from two contrasting perspectives. The first one considers the urban-rural dichotomy and suggests that the gap between what we can consider urban and what we can think rural is so prominent on an economic, educational, health, and cultural level that it becomes impossible to dissolve and avoid their distinction, especially from a planning perspective (Roy, 2005). Moreover, regarding institutional competencies, this literature highlights how urban-rural distinction becomes fundamental at a political and implementation level (Urso, 2021). The second perspective through which to address left-behind places overcome such dichotomy and explores extended urbanization as a continuous process where the urban-rural distinction can be transcended, and the urban fabric can be conceived as a "net of uneven mesh" worldwide (Brenner, 2014; 2016). This position translates into going beyond the city as the sole unit of analysis by shifting the study of cities from "fixed things" and "bounded entities" to addressing urban areas as the result of differentiated processes of concentrated, extended, and differentiated urbanization and development.

When considering left-behind places from a framework of **peripherality**, they have been traditionally addressed from a position that considers peripheralization of places as a process of weakening and

decoupling from physical and knowledge networks that reduces the access and participation opportunities for people in certain places, generating and amplifying geographical inequalities (Lang et al., 2015). However, emerging literature highlights the centrality - epistemologically, spatially, socially, culturally, and economically – of contemporary peripheral places. It does so by building upon the notion of "peripheral centralities" as the places and spaces whose function is critical to building regional integration beyond metropolitan areas. Within this vision, peripheries are not dull nor empty; instead, "they provide glimpses of a diverse set of processes, actors, and interests that contribute to the fashioning of a measure of centrality" (Phelps et al., 2023:1163). In a recent paper, Gluckler and Shermur (2023) challenge traditional views associated with peripheral areas, namely its lack of innovation. They argue for a relational perspective, where 'periphery' and 'centre' are positions within a network, rather than static or fixed categories, emphasizing that innovation can indeed originate in peripheries due to their distinct features, suggesting that peripheral positions can also offer unique opportunities for innovation.

Considering **marginality** as a process that needs to be traced and understood from its different forms (Lancione and McFarlane, 2016), literature relates left-behind places and marginalization in different ways. First, it highlights how marginalization in non-metropolitan areas is driven by policy fixation with large cities (Pike et al. 2023). This issue reflects political and methodological metrocentrism (Bunnell and Maringanti, 2010) as well as the tendency to consider proximity, scale, and agglomeration as the crucial ingredients for integration and growth (Storper and Scott, 2016). Second, it emphasizes how marginalization reinforces the economic, social, cultural, and sanitary gap between urban centres and non-metropolitan areas to the point of broadening multidimensional inequalities (Kühn, 2015). Third, literature in the field of rural studies highlights how the marginality of non-urban areas is strongly related to what they call Rural Silence (Woods, 2007; 2012); a position that challenges the interpretation of rural areas and their inhabitants as "outsiders" who reflect a bucolic, innocent and romantic environment, and invites to consider non-urban areas spaces for political, economic and cultural engagement and contestation (Argent, 2016).

Box 1.

Working definitions of Left behind areas /Left Behindness for different audiences

Box 1 - working definitions of left-behind areas

<p>Academia</p>	<p>The Re-Place project engages with the idea of left-behind' as an analytical term, label and a spatial imaginary. "Left-behindness" is a complex, multi-dimensional issue affecting former industrial and rural areas that have suffered due to economic and technological shifts under globalization. These places, seen as falling behind more prosperous regions, experience a combination of economic, demographic, and social decline. Rather than being a term of comparison, Re-Place sees LBAs as embedded in mutually dependent networks shaped by dynamics between declining peripheral areas and dynamic metropolitan cores. Heightened social and spatial inequalities, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, have worsened conditions for these communities in several ways including: the erosion of civic assets and social infrastructure; visible abandonment in the physical landscape (Dzenovska, 2020); disenchantment of the population even leading to discontent and increasing support for extreme right-wing or populist parties, exacerbated by the external stigma of being perceived as "left behind."</p>
<p>Public administration / Third sector</p>	<p>Left-behindness might appear stigmatizing to local authorities in the peripheral areas that Re-Place will work in. However, Re-Place is interested in the <i>agency sensitive</i> understanding of spatial inequalities provided by left-behindness. This focuses on the agency and capacities existing in places. To create tailored solutions for places, policies are likely to be more effective if they build on existing local knowledge, community-based assets and capital across different sectors (social, cultural, political and environmental) alongside economically driven interventions (Pike et al., 2023).</p> <p>The approach followed in Re-Place suggests that traditional economic indicators of development used in local regional and development policy to measure inequalities or left-behindness are lacking. Other aspects are also central to local development, wellbeing and population retention such as belonging, place attachment, social infrastructures, the social economy and diversity (Tomaney et al. 2013; MacKinnon et al. 2023). Furthermore, understanding belonging, identity and the public mood can help local policymakers to promote positive narratives, social diversity and social cohesion to reverse any stigmatizing effects.</p>
<p>Private stakeholders</p>	<p>For private stakeholders, businesses, investors and community organization, the relevance of left-behindness has several important dimensions. There may be economic revitalization potential and pools of untapped local talent, which with training could potentially create a stable workforce, given the lack of other economic opportunities. There are unmet needs in LBAs which may open up markets realisable with more affordable investment given lower land and property costs in comparison with more economically dynamic regions. Targeting inequalities and local development make investment attractive from a social sustainability and social impact perspective. Working to boost positive representations of left-behind areas and developing relationships with local communities can enhance local place identity and belonging as well as increasing the success of private-sector ventures and interventions. This might also be repaid by the local community through local support for businesses and associations.</p>

4.2 The mobility dimension: What can we learn from classical migration theories about migration to non-metropolitan areas?

Josefina Dominguez-Mujica, Cristobal Mendoza, Mercedes Rodriguez and Juan Manuel Parreño

4.2.1 The traditional explanations on emigration/immigration: the focus on emigration from rural to urban areas

Most of the classical theories on internal and international migration have focused on areas where structural economic forces tend to impact the evolution of the population, favouring different processes of emigration/immigration. These processes come to be a cause of the markdown of human capital, impoverishment, and absence of local development in some places, while, at the same time, favour the concentration of resources, workforce, and wealth in others, an endless cycle feeding again and again the contradistinctions between winning areas and losing areas. Therefore, classical theories on migration interpreted the flows of emigration/immigration as *raison d'être* for imbalances between abandoned spaces and emerging spaces. In classical terms the first are rural areas and the last urban centres. So, according to Ravenstein's (1889) traditional "laws of migration", the first theory on migration, the economic differences between rural and urban areas, and the desire of residents in rural areas to improve their living standards led to displacements to large commercial and economic centres (Ravenstein, 1889).

An evolution of these explanations constituted the push-pull theory from Petersen (1958). This author defended that the flows of emigration/immigration rest on the income differences between rural areas and urban centres. The factors causing these differences exert an attraction from urban centres and a repulse for rural areas. In fact, once a rural migration flow begins, it grows steadily as members of that community gain migration-related knowledge and resources from family and friends who may have already moved out. This push-pull theory has conceptualized international migrations as defended by sociologist Lee S. Everett. According to him, the economic differences between advanced and less developed countries significantly increased during the 1960s, and the differences between agricultural and urban areas within all countries became more pronounced (Everett, 1966). Consequently, an articulation between push and pull factors was created at all scales of analysis, which would feedback and generate migration tendencies. This dynamic was considered by Myrdal (1967) as a set of elements of a cumulative causation theory.

All these explanations put the focus on a macro level perspective of migrations, on the engine of imbalances inherent to the specialization and spatialization of wealth and poverty. However, simultaneously, during the second half of the twentieth century, a new approach was developed, namely theories based on a micro level perspective formulated for Sjaastad (1962); Lee (1962); Becker, (1993); Borjas (1999), *inter alia*. All of them defended the necessity of considering the micro level perspective

because the decisions about emigration from rural areas occur after the calculation made by individuals about the cost-benefit of emigrating. And these decisions also appear at a meso-level, since there are household strategies that try to maximize income, diversify sources, and reduce risks through emigration, as defended by the New Economic Migration theory from Stark & Bloom (1985).

Finally, complementary to these perspectives, the “Institutional theory” by Goss & Lindquist (1995), highlights the role of organizations, institutions and business or intermediaries on conditioning patterns of migrations for their growing influence on personal or household decisions on the advantages or disadvantages to migrate.

4.2.2 The traditional explanations on emigration/immigration: the focus on the potential immigration to rural areas

Although the predominant approach, until the end of the 1980s, was that of explanatory theories on the so-called rural exodus and its causes — inherent to Fordist capitalism—, some authors reflected on counter-movements, those which occurred when the rural environment offered opportunities for immigrants. From the focus of the Neoclassical theory, Lewis, in 1954, and Harris & Todaro, in 1970, among others, referred to the loss of an available work force in rural areas as a cause of an increase in wages and this comparative advantage could exert attraction for potential immigrants.

This line of reasoning also includes the theory of the dual labour market, already advanced by Piore (1979) and outlined by Massey (1990). According to this, a dual structure of the labour market facilitates the hiring of less qualified workers in its secondary segments, in areas less developed, where there is a persistent shortage of labour force because of the fact that those places had been affected by long periods of emigration.

In this context, we witness important contributions from a historical-structural perspective within the framework of World Systems Theory by Mabogunje (1970); Sassen (1988); and Wallerstein (1996), among others. They analyse the consequences of the entry of owners and managers of multinational firms in some rural areas in search of farmland, raw materials, new consumers, etc., which attracted new migrants. During this time, there were internal emigration processes towards areas with a higher level of local/regional development (traditional explanations about emigration) in developed countries and, particularly, in the European Union. At the same time, new flows of international immigration headed to areas in decline, which addressed the demand for labour in low-skilled tasks, especially in the agricultural sector. These theoretical reflections were formulated as a critique of global capitalism and the “development of underdevelopment”, given that sustained processes continued to produce a workforce surplus in industrialised countries. This excess is to this date instrumental to global capitalism and very visible in the presence of migrant workers in agricultural and industrial sector, as well as in tourism (Morén-Alegret et al., 2021).

In addition, other approaches focus on the attraction of less developed areas from the perspective of return. According to the Human Capital Theory, Jáuregui-Díaz & Recaño-Valverde (2014), for example, defended that return is a strategy for emigrants to maximize income in rural or deprived areas, taking advantage of human capital accumulated in the places of migration. In her research on the relationship between the return of migrants to Portuguese rural areas and their tourism development, Santos (2023) highlights the importance of social capital obtained by tourism business initiatives of former emigrants. These are interpretations from a relational context, as Farrell et al. have defended in their study on return migration in West Ireland (2012). Further, as formulated by Phenomenological Theory (Schutz, 1945), the attraction of the symbolic nature of places and how this is perceived from a distance tends to increase the desire and willingness to return. Similarly, Goodwin-Hawkins & Dafydd Jones (2022) interpreted the responses of migrants interviewed in research developed in West Wales and the Valleys as impelled by a subjective perception, due to their qualification of the place of return as cleaner, less stressful, cheaper, and slower.

On the other hand, return can also be considered not only as an individual experience, but also a fact linked to social and structural factors. This creates distinction between "conservative returnees" who do not intend to change the social context that they had left before migrating, rather, they help to preserve it; "retired returnees", those who decide to return to their place of origin to spend their old age; and "innovative returnees", actors who put into practice all the means and skills they have acquired during their migratory experiences (Cassarino, 2004; King & Skeldon, 2010).

Lastly, the relationship between processes of emigration and those of immigration and/or return has been theorized by Circular Migration Theory (Newland et al., 2008; Prothero & Chapman, 2012; Triandafyllidou, 2013). This theory defends the intimate relationship between emigration and immigration processes, as a result of the existence of repetitive cycles, of a great variety of movements, generally of short duration, having as a common denominator, the absence of a declared intention of permanence in place for a long period of time.

4.2.3 New paradigms on mobility and transnationalism

Classical theories on migratory processes, previously described, have been challenged through the formulation of new paradigms. These are coincident with theorization on world economic globalization, which has been evident since the late nineteen-eighties, when significant transformations in the world production system and major changes in the economic, political, and social structure occurred. Simultaneously with the greater complexity that migration processes acquire, in close relationship with this new international order, different paradigms were formulated within Social Sciences. These opened a new stage in the conceptualization of mobility and its links with place. We refer to the "transnational approach" and "mobilities paradigm".

“Transnationalism” is the new mirror in which migration scholars look at the multiple ties and interactions linking people across borders as a consequence of mobilities (Vertovec, 2010). So, the transnational approach focusses its attention on the transnational relations built by migrants, given that they organize their lives in social fields that transcend the limits of areas of provenance and destinations, which has numerous implications for the level of roots and connections between distant places (Faist, 1998, 2010; Portes et al., 1999). In this way, the forms and mechanisms of unfinished and multi-directional migration flows contribute to the formation of cross-border social entities such as transnational professional networks, transnational kinship groups, transnational organizations, and diasporas (Amelina & Faist, 2012). And beyond these social formations, transnationalism enables the interpretation of migration in a context of dynamic linkage of individuals with the material and social worlds that they live and experience through relationships that they weave between different places.

For its part, the mobilities paradigm encompasses multiple mobilities - outgoing migration, commuting, international migration, lifestyle migrations, immigration, temporal/seasonal displacements, return migration, movements linked to second homes, entrepreneurial migrations, decisions on immobility or staying, digital nomadism, tourism flows, etc. - as well as the relationships and overlaps presupposed by these flows (Montanari & Staniscia, 2016). Consequently, mobility is measured by the interaction between mobilities for production and/or mobilities for consumption, with a weak delimitation between both. Therefore, it integrates the idea that individuals are progressively relocating in pursuit of self-realization and an enhanced quality of life, rather than solely for economic motives. This is clear in lifestyle migration and mobilities as an analytical tool to understand subjective meanings underlying the relocation and movement of relatively privileged people (Benson & O'Reilly, 2009; Janoschka & Haas, 2013; McGarrigle, 2022). However, the most interesting of these approaches is the concurrent valorisation of places due to the spatial turn within Social Sciences enhancing the role of mobility in the process of interrelation between the local, on the one side, and the regional, national, or international dimension, on the other (glocalization) (Sheller & Urry, 2006; Adey et al., 2014; Cresswell, 2006; Hall, 2009; Montanari, 2005, Sheller, 2017; McGarrigle & Ascensão, 2018).

In most of the aforementioned theories, when mobility comes into play, references to places point to dichotomies such as: rural-urban, less developed-more developed, depopulated-overcrowded, deprived-rich, disadvantaged-powerful, etc. Thus, the concept of mobilities is inherently linked to place and, particularly, to the socioeconomic and well-being imbalances between places. The Re-Place project focusses on left-behind areas, which adds rising populism and political and cultural disenchantment to the traditional economic reasons that might drive migration. The question is what implications does this concept carry from the point of view of mobilities? What do the aforementioned mobility paradigms add to our understanding of dynamics in LBAs?

This objective is also pursued by other ongoing European research projects as: (i) “The rural-urban divide in Europe” (RUDE), funded by NORFACE (New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Cooperation in Europe), European Union's Horizon 2020 (2021-2023); (ii) “VISION Project”, funded by the Volkswagen Foundation as part of the Challenges for Europe initiative. Envisioning Convivial Europe (2022-2025); (iii) “Twin transition and changing patterns of spatial mobility: a regional approach (MOBI-TWIN), funded by The European Union’s Horizon Europe Programme (2023-2026); and (iv) “Policy recommendations to maximise the beneficial impact of unexplored mobilities in and beyond the European Union (PREMIUM_EU), funded by The European Union’s Horizon Europe Programme (2023-2026).

Box 2 - working definitions of mobility and migration

<p>Academia</p>	<p>The concept behind <i>Re-Place</i> suggests shifting the focus from migration studies to mobility studies. In practice we draw on the work of Amelina (2022), who proposed a "performativist 'doing-migration' approach," which integrates transnational, multiscalar, and decolonial ideas from various perspectives. This approach means analyzing how actors, organizations, or institutions use performative naming strategies related to "migration," both in the origin and destination countries contexts. Essentially, focusing on "doing migration" in transnational studies means examining how individuals are labelled as migrants (migrantised) in certain contexts (typically in receiving countries) and how this label is removed or reassigned in others (usually in the countries of origin) (Barglowski 2019; Amelina, 2022: 10). The focus in <i>Re-Place</i> is on spatial mobilities/immobilities of the whole population rather than analysing only migrant groups as a means toward demigrantisation (Dahinden, 2016) - see box. 6. According to new paradigms, mobilities can be measured along a mobility continuum by the interaction between those for production and/or those for consumption, with a weak delimitation between both. Individuals are progressively relocating in pursuit of self-realization and an enhanced quality of life, rather than solely for economic reasons, organizing their lives through relationships that they weave between different places. This makes it necessary to unveil the role of places not only from the economic perspective but from that of the wellbeing and political and cultural attachment.</p>
<p>Public administration / Third sector</p>	<p>Inward mobility might provide positive transformations in the economy, social fabric, and demography of LBAs. These transformations have important implications in local development feeding the current debate on the new role of mobility in left-behind areas in the post-pandemic scenario. All these changes can be interpreted across a broad spectrum due to the interlinking of places to mobility through production and leisure, as well as the digital space itself in which remote workers act. However, inward mobilities may face resistance among local populations, especially since the presence of anti-system political parties blame out-migration and new migrations for some of the challenges in LBAs. Remaining mindful of potential social polarization, challenges related to political representation, and aspects involving cultural diversity and local identities is key for public administrators and third-sector members</p>

	In this regard, place-based policies may contribute to the development of targeted strategies that effectively ensure the welfare of migrants and people on the move.
Private stakeholders	Private stakeholders in LBAs might not only consider labour immigration but multiple mobilities along a continuum like commuting, international migration, internal migration, lifestyle migration, return migration, temporal/seasonal displacements, movements linked to second homes, entrepreneurial migrations, decisions on immobility or staying, digital nomadism, and tourism flows. Beyond the availability of labour force, the potential of spatial mobilities also contributes to social innovation; increasing commercial offer/ businesses and cultural activities, and to a context of social diversity which could, in turn, attract more people, investment and valorise the local community, favouring the process of interrelationships between the local, on the one side, and the regional, national, or international dimension, on the other.

4.2.4 Reflections on immobilities

While Malmberg (1997) focussed our attention on the ‘immobility paradox’, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, “the Immobility Turn” was coined. According to Cairns & Clemente (2023), this refers to the transformations that took place in geographical mobility since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, with long periods of restricted access to international and interregional circulation constituting a loss of the previously taken-for-granted freedom to travel.

Among the theoretical precedents of immobility, stands out the defence that immobility is another side of mobility or that the absence of mobility should not be interpreted as lack of progress. On the contrary, some scholars defend that immobility is also a valid subjective choice or a deliberate and informed election (Cresswell, 2014; Hannam et al., 2006; Salazar, 2020; Schewel, 2020, Hofstede et al., 2023). Thus, in migration research it is necessary to overcome the analytical disconnection between migrants, on the one hand, and on stayers, on the other, given that immobility is not a passive process and stayers also exert agency (Huijsmans, 2014).

From a biographical approach, staying is a decision informed by present contexts or circumstances, but also shaped by past experiences and future anticipations (Barcus & Halfacree, 2018) and this does not preclude mobility entirely, as it can manifest in various forms, such as short distance commuting for work-related reasons or even long-distance commuting (Huber & Nowotny, 2013). Thus, staying is a demographic process linked to the life course of individuals, a longer-term process evolving over the life course as an outcome of a complex interplay between personal considerations closely associated with the stayer's past, present, and anticipated future biography (Stockdale et al. 2018). Further, staying is a relational process linked to the lives of others (parents, partners, and children) through either choice or a sense of obligation in the context of the family life-cycle (McAuley & Nutty, 1982).

One of the most frequent reasons for staying in one place than for moving is the proximity to family, especially in the case of women (Thomassen, 2021; Palomares-Linares et al., 2023). Ties to local family play an important role in the staying experiences (Hälm, 2014) because family forms a social resource, both in terms of support, care, or refuge in difficult times, and the provision of help in gaining access to local educational and job opportunities (Mulder, 2018).

Synthetically, residential choice normally entails the following issues: (i) motives such as being close to friends or family (Stockdale & Haartsen, 2018); (ii) motives such as wanting to live in a rural landscape or a rural location (Feijten et al., 2008); (iii) motives based on being attached to an area (Mellander et al., 2011); (iv) motives such as housing and work (Stockdale & Ferguson, 2020) or facilities.

All these circumstances acquired a great interest during the pandemic when different perspectives to those above mentioned on immobility were discussed. With respect to the work force, the health measures to contain the pandemic also brought out great unbalances with respect to the human mobility reorganization. As stated by Kellerman (2022: 250), the coronavirus lockdowns expanded both edges of immobility: strongly restricted and widely forbade physical mobility, coupled with a widely expanding virtual mobility, used not just for social communications but for work. The relationship between immobility and mobility implied a health risk for those workers who could not change the office for home.

Consequently, COVID-19 intensified the existing uneven relations of (im)mobilities (Adey et al., 2021), since immigrants suffered the risk of exposure to contagion more than other workers because of their disproportionate representation in the essential workforce (seasonal workers in the agricultural sector; workers who make their living out of formal and informal cross-border trade; low-skilled migrant workers who provide health and care services; etc.). At the same time, the cancellation or expiration of their visas meant a drop in their income level and the impossibility of sending remittances to their families, harming the economy of their home countries (Domínguez-Mujica & Montanari, 2022).

In post-pandemic times, the question is what new interpretations of the (im)mobilities paradigm are meaningful in light of socioeconomic and environmental reconfigurations (Domínguez-Mujica et al., 2023). So, the pandemic, which contained many of the international flows of travellers, paradoxically favoured residential relocation and nomadism linked to teleworking (Goodwin-Hawkins & Dafydd Jones, 2022). In this context, it is important to analyse changes in relation to place. In the Fordist productive organization, place represented a defining factor of identity—a space for living and working together—, whereas, to the contrary, in post-Fordist capitalism places are interlinked to production, leisure or mobility, as well as the digital space itself in which nomads and remote workers develop (Parreño-Castellano et al., 2023). These transformations have had important implications in local development feeding the current debate on the new role of remote and rural areas in the post-pandemic scenario.

4.3 The socio-economic dimension: What do we know about local development and migration in non-metropolitan areas?

Josefina Dominguez-Mujica, Cristobal Mendoza, Mercedes Rodriguez and Juan Manuel Parreño

4.3.1. The migration-development nexus. What do we know about local development and migration in non-metropolitan areas?

The conventional perspective on the migration-development nexus primarily concentrated on the "sending countries," especially on their rural areas where migrants' remittances and resources play a crucial role in supporting domestic economies (Nyberg Sørensen, van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003; Nzima, Duma, & Moyo, 2017). Remittances serve as a significant financial influx for rural regions in numerous developing nations. Beyond mere monetary transactions, these financial contributions can be utilized for diverse purposes such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure development, thereby fostering economic advancement in the countries of origin (de Haas, 2007; Cohen, 2011; Carling, 2014). Undoubtedly, one of the most immediate and concrete impacts of remittances on sending countries is the economic upliftment of rural households, serving as a vital means of income that withstands economic uncertainties and plays a crucial role in alleviating poverty. However, despite the economic advantages that emigration brings to sending communities, there is a significant concern regarding the potential adverse effects of brain drain. This occurs when skilled individuals migrate in search of better opportunities abroad, leaving their home countries, especially rural areas, with a shortage of qualified workers (see, for instance, Bhagwati & Hamada, 1974; Baláž & Williams, 2002; Czaika & Orazbayev, 2018).

In recent times, there has been a resurgence in the exploration of the relationship between migration and development (Faist & Fauser, 2011; Fredholm, Sandberg, & Frödin, 2022). Presently, the discourse increasingly centres on migrants as active contributors to development, reflecting a paradigm that posits migration can yield favourable outcomes for both emigration and immigration countries. In the case of receiving countries, governments that were previously hesitant to link economic growth with labour immigration now view immigrants as potential agents for revitalizing numerous rural areas in the Global North (Golding & Curtis, 2013). This is particularly critical considering that many developed economies have undergone the demographic transition, resulting in fewer children and longer life expectancies, coupled with the out-migration of the youth due to economic restructuring. In this context, immigration holds significant development potential and is gaining relevance in population and regional policies across various EU member states³ (Weidinger, 2022). In this regard, the MATILDE project (Migration impact assessment to enhance integration and local development in European rural and mountain region), funded by H2020-SC6-MIGRATION (2020-2022), reviews various initiatives across Europe for attracting new residents into left-behind areas, particularly into rural mountain areas⁴. On the sending countries' side, the nexus between migration and development increasingly acknowledges the concept of "brain gain," highlighting the positive contributions of diaspora communities. Skilled migrants often play a role in

knowledge transfer, establishing trade networks, and participating in collaborative initiatives that can enhance the development prospects of their home countries (see, for instance, Koser & Salt, 1997; Lowell & Findlay, 2002).

4.3.2. Theories on Local Development

The evolution of local development theories is marked by a progression from initial viewpoints that underscored the significance of territory and internal actors to contemporary perspectives on neo-endogenous development. The latter stresses the importance of collaboration between local and international actors, a critical aspect for the exchange of knowledge, resources, and expertise mainly in rural areas. Both approaches emphasize the establishment of social capital between existing and incoming residents in specific territories, aiming to foster economic and social networks that, in turn, can catalyse innovative initiatives in both economic and social domains at the local level. The focus in this section is on rural areas, notwithstanding the fact that LBAs encompass a wider range of territories. The neo-endogenous paradigm was defined by the OECD as a "new rural paradigm", and it inspired the so-called "Rural Policy 3.0" (Belliggiano et al., 2020). This paradigm arises above all from the need to interpret processes of social change in rural areas (Bosworth & Atterton, 2012). Like the endogenous approach, neo-endogenous perspectives align with a consideration of the social aspects of local development, avoiding an exclusive emphasis on economic growth. Thus, this approach provides a comprehensive framework that embraces all population groups by integrating the concepts of quality of life and well-being.

The neo-endogenous paradigm considers collaboration between local and international stakeholders which is crucial for sharing knowledge, resources, and expertise. If we take the example of rural societies, here local development cannot operate in isolation from forces outside the local area and the ability to generate extra-local connectivity through effective networks becomes a key feature of rural development (Ray, 2006; Gkartzios & Lowe, 2019). It posits that, by striking a balance between local needs and global realities, in this instance, rural societies can strive towards a more sustainable and equitable future (Gkartzios and Lowe, 2019; Kluvankova et al., 2021).

In accepting the need for external factors, neo-endogenous development is somehow a hybrid endogenous-exogenous model which seeks to both support communities to be self-reliant and provide them with the capabilities to utilise extra-local factors to their advantage (Ray, 1999). Certainly, neo-endogenous research identified that economies in rural areas benefit from interactions between local and more outwardly facing businesses (Bosworth & Atterton, 2012), promoting social innovation and civic values. This is particularly true in marginalised rural areas that are often struggling with market limits and shortages of public funding (Kluvankova et al., 2021). Such findings are interesting for future research in LBAs.

Applying a place perspective to the neo-endogenous model of development, it interrogates the potential of migration and mobility in development pathways by asking if these new residents contribute to economic and social innovation (e.g. diversifying businesses and promoting cultural activities) at the local level in left-behind areas. In this way, internal migrants and international immigrants alike may contribute to contexts of more dynamic economic and cultural settings which could, in turn, attract more people, investment and valorise the local community and place identity (Labrianidis & Sykas, 2013; Marango, Bosworth & Curry, 2021)

In this sense, if we take the example of rural enterprises, they engage with locational, institutional, material and identity dimensions of “places” (Smith and McColl, 2016; Steiner and Teasdale, 2019). This relates to the concept of “placial embeddedness”, understood as the entrepreneur’s intimate knowledge and use of the local physical, cultural and historical landscapes and the concern shown for the well-being of the places (Korsgaard et al., 2015). Once again exemplifying rural (social) enterprises, “placial hybridity”, could foster social innovation that contributes to neo-endogenous development (Olmedo, van Twuijver & O’Shaughnessy, 2021).

A neo-endogenous model of development represents a better resource to address existing local development issues in left-behind areas, as a point of departure for citizen empowerment and engagement (MacKinnon et al., 2022). The focus of the neo-endogenous development remains on local participation and local determination of key priorities. This approach places local communities at the centre of development processes, emphasizing their agency, resources, and capacities.

Recently, different EU-funded projects deal with the impact of immigration on rural development. This is the case of the project entitled “Selective migration and unbalanced sex ratio in rural regions” (SEMIGRA) (2010-2012) which argues that selective migration in many rural and economically weak regions in Europe may help to develop strategies for territorial development and, in doing so, stabilize demographic and enhance social development in left-behind areas. Similarly, the project MATILDE (Migration impact assessment to enhance integration and local development in European rural and mountain region), funded by H2020-SC6-MIGRATION (2020-2022), focuses on the impact of third countries migration on the local development of rural and mountain regions. The underlying idea is the potential capability of immigration to trigger development in the medium and long run, especially in remote areas, to counterbalance depopulation and economic decline. In the same vein, the SURDIM project (“International immigration and sustainable rural development in the Pyrenees. The case of Girona and Huesca Pyrenees (Spain) and the Eastern Pyrenees in France” (SURDIM) (2021-2022 y 2023), funded by MSCA Programme of the European Commission aimed to study international immigration (some of them lifestyle immigrants) in rural municipalities in the Pyrenees to identify sustainable economic initiatives managed and/or supported by immigrant entrepreneurs. Since Pyrenees rural localities may face depopulation and ageing which, in

turn, might hamper local economies, foreign-born immigrants and, especially, immigrant entrepreneurs, may be a key piece in enhancing successful experiences concerning rural development. Indeed, international “cosmovillagers”, as coined by Morén-Alegret et al. (2021), are active inhabitants in small Pyrenees villages who actively engage in revitalisation. Finally, considering the social dimensions of local development (and not only the economic perspective), the project WELCOMING SPACES, funded by Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (call H2020-SC6-MIGRATION, 2020-2022), explores new ways to enhance the revitalisation of shrinking areas in the EU. Revitalisation here refers to the processes making left-behind regions attractive for new residents in the sense they may offer a welcoming space for non-EU migrants to pursue their life projects.

4.3.3 Place-based social capital

Social capital is placed at the centre of neo-endogenous rural development model (Ray, 2006; Bosworth et al., 2016). The concept of social capital itself has become mainstream in local, national and EU documents and programmes and in migration studies with the inclusion of social capital in transnational practices (Levitt, 1998). Yet, there has been calls for critical research into how and in what way social capital is a driver of territorial development. The idea beyond this is that networks must be activated to be meaningful. Place-based social capital in left-behind areas may (or may not) trigger local development initiatives in the domain of the economics and society.

In this regard, mobilising social capital in left-behind territories might illuminate social relations that do not correspond with portraying the periphery as stable, backward, and unproductive, and all this functions as a counter-narrative to discourses on periphery and feelings of powerlessness (Svendsen 2013; Willet and Lang 2018). This in turn may help place identity and local governance. As a matter of fact, reaching agreements on shared principles and goals and undertaking collective actions through negotiated decisions in marginalized areas may be more achievable than in central urban settings (Jørgensen, Fallov & Nielsen, 2021). This could also ease the process of integrating new residents economically and socially.

Social capital may change when in-migrants arrive in rural and left-behind areas. The way new residents of these localities form social networks and how these are intertwined with the local economy, social fabric, and institutional framework in marginalised areas may be key for economic and social innovations (Marango, Bosworth & Curry, 2021). Immigrants’ social capital might foster economic and social innovations which are brought forth in an action arena. However, they might not be sufficient for the exercise of social cohesion and social control, since interaction is embedded in local traditions and social order is locally-produced.

Social innovation, broadly defined as “innovation in social relations, as well as in meeting human needs” (MacCallum et al., 2009), constitutes a key component for the development of rural areas (Bock, 2016).

The importance of social innovation for rural development is threefold; first, social innovation as a process focuses on collective processes through which different stakeholders align their interests when developing new solutions for a rural area. Hence, social innovation entails cross-sectoral, collective and collaborative learning and action (Neumeier, 2017). Second, social innovation as an outcome is a response to unmet needs through new solutions that benefit a whole community or a vulnerable group within it. In doing so, social innovation might contribute to the provision of otherwise non-existent or non-accessible services, products, infrastructures/assets to rural communities (Bosworth et al., 2020). Third, social innovation emphasises the need for socio-political connectivity in (marginalised) rural areas, expanding across various spatial scales (Bock, 2016).

The territory itself has a crucial role in shaping social capitals and fostering social innovation. Left-behind territories may be specific entrepreneurial milieu with distinct physical, social and economic characteristics. Location, natural resources and the landscape, social capital, rural governance, business and social networks, as well as information and communication technologies, might exert dynamic and complex influences on entrepreneurial activity in rural areas. If rurality may be viewed as a dynamic entrepreneurial resource that shapes both opportunities and constraints, the same hypothesis maybe tested in LBAs.

Some case studies illustrate the relevance of the construction of immigrant social networks for economic growth, social wellbeing and local governance. Eimermann (2016), for instance, when investigating the effects on Dutch rural tourism entrepreneurs in Sweden, argues that a tourism-migration nexus occurs where the entrepreneurs are attracted by territorial capital before migration and use this capital in their firms to attract new tourists after migration. Olmedo, van Twuijver and O'Shaughnessy (2023) also show how the link between rural social enterprises and their local context, including immigrant employment, since these enterprises engage with locational, material and identity dimensions of their "places". From a governance point of view, Labrianidis and Sykas (2013) reckon that the interaction of immigrants with the place-based structures is easier in rural contexts, creates a favourable environment for immigrants' incorporation in local economies and societies.

Box 3 - working definitions of local development

<p>Academia</p>	<p>The neo-endogenous development approach has become a prominent paradigm within local development theories. It builds on the principles of endogenous development, which emphasizes local control, resources, and capacities, but, differently, the neo-endogenous perspective integrates external connections and influences to foster sustainable development. Therefore, economic growth local development is viewed not in isolation but in connection with external forces, emphasizing the pivotal role of effective networks.</p> <p>This approach positions local communities at the forefront of development processes, highlighting their agency. In this context, the social capital of individuals, encompassing both new and longstanding residents, is intricately linked with the local economy, social fabric, and institutional framework. Place-based social capital may contribute to stimulate economic and social innovations that emerge in an action arena, where actors agree on common principles and goals. Mobilizing social capital through territorial ties sheds light on social relations that defy portrayals of left-behind areas as stable, stagnant, backward, and unproductive.</p>
<p>Public administration / Third sector</p>	<p>Public administration acts as a central force in local development by setting policies, allocating resources, and implementing programs that address the specific needs of communities. Governments are certainly responsible for creating and maintaining infrastructure. Public administrators are also instrumental in addressing social issues such as education, healthcare, housing, and public safety. All this is crucial for reducing inequality and improving the overall quality of life of residents.</p> <p>Specifically, local administration plays a key role in (neo)endogenous development, since it works directly with the needs and aspirations of the communities. On the other hand, Third Sector organizations are often more flexible and can address specific needs that may be overlooked by administrations. They play a pivotal role in advocating for marginalized groups, promoting social inclusion, and fostering community engagement. They often operate at the grassroots level, enabling them to respond quickly to emerging issues and adapt to the unique characteristics of local communities.</p>
<p>Private stakeholders</p>	<p>The most direct contributions of private stakeholders to local development is through economic growth and job creation. Businesses, both large and small, drive local economies by creating jobs, stimulating social entrepreneurship, generating income, paying taxes and stimulating demand for goods and services.</p> <p>Private stakeholders typically prioritize a classical exogenous approach when addressing local development. Entrepreneurs often recognize the value of physical infrastructure (e.g. roads and railways) and networking connections (e.g. internet) for promoting business growth. Connectivity is indeed vital for the movement of inputs, goods, and workers within a region.</p> <p>The role of private stakeholders in local development is most effective when it is part of a collaborative effort involving public administration, the third sector, and the community at large. Public-private partnerships can be a powerful tool for local development, combining the efficiency and innovation of the private sector with the regulatory support and social mandate of the public sector.</p>

4.4 Psycho-social dimension: Place attachment and wellbeing

Barbara Staniscia and Astrid Safina

4.4.1 Place attachment

Place is an intricate space that acquires its significance through personal, group, or cultural processes. These places can take on various dimensions, differing in size, scope, tangibility, symbolism, and can even exist as known, experienced, unknown, or entirely imaginary entities (Altman & Low, 1992).

Place attachment, a multifaceted phenomenon, encompasses affect, emotion, feelings, knowledge, beliefs, behaviours, and actions (Altman & Low, 1992). It revolves around a deep connection to one's family roots, cherished memories, and the sense of belonging associated with a home. Social factors, such as closeness to family, friends, and the community, also play a vital role in shaping this attachment. Moreover, living memory, familiarity with the environment, and the distinctive physical and natural qualities of the area all contribute significantly to the development of place attachment (Stockdale et al., 2018).

Altman & Low (1992) proposed four main dimensions to understand place attachment: (i) biological, (ii) environmental, (iii) psychological, and (iv) sociocultural. Eisenhauer et al. (2000) introduced two components: (i) the social component, involving the relationship between individuals and their family, friends, and community, and (ii) the geographical component, relating to the unique geographical features that define a place (Shamai & Ilatov, 2005). Both biophysical-environmental and socio-cultural factors act as significant influences in place attachment, with the former acting as "magnets" and the latter serving as "anchors" to a place (Lewicka, 2011). According to Kalterborn (1997), place attachment develops through a multitude of factors, including the natural and cultural environment, the quality of relationships with family and friends, as well as the history and traditions of the place (Shamai & Ilatov, 2005).

Altman & Low (1992) also identify several related concepts connected to place attachment, such as topophilia (Tuan, 1974), place identity (Proshansky, Fabian, and Kaminoff, 1983), insidedness (Rowles, 1980), genres of place (Hufford, 1992), sense of place or rootedness (Chawla, 1992), environmental embeddedness, community sentiment, and identity (Hummon, 1992).

Place attachment is observable from individual, family, and community perspectives. This attachment extends beyond the physical-environmental aspects to include the relational dimension, meaning attachment to a place also signifies attachment to the community associated with it (Altman & Low, 1992). Place attachment can manifest at different scales, whether it be attachment to one's ancestors' house, a specific locality, or even an entire region (Stockdale et al., 2018).

Shamai and Ilatov (2005) argue that place attachment is nurtured through extensive and profound experiences in a place and active involvement in its activities. According to Relph (1976) and Tuan (1977), attachment to a place is further strengthened through the existence and sharing of symbols, rituals, myths, and meanings (Shamai & Ilatov, 2005). Numerous studies have revealed that place attachment varies among individuals due to different factors: (i) ethnic differences: Sigelman & Henig (2001) highlight variations in place attachment based on ethnic differences; (ii) residential status: Hay (1998) notes that real estate owners tend to have higher place attachment compared to renters, although the causality of this relationship may be reversed; (iii) social belonging: Hay (1998) also indicates that stronger involvement in community life leads to stronger place attachment, but this relationship may also work in reverse; (iv) rural vs. urban population: Shamai & Kellerman (1985) find that place attachment is higher in rural areas than in urban areas; (v) age differences: Shamay & Ilatov (2005) report that older people tend to have higher place attachment compared to younger individuals; (vi) traditions: Shamay & Ilatov (2005) suggest that people who follow traditions are more likely to have a stronger place attachment (Shamai & Ilatov, 2005).

Stokols and Shumaker (1981) define place-dependent individuals as those who perceive a strong association with a specific place. Place dependence can vary in scale, such as being attached to one's home but not the office, and it can be individual or part of a group (Lewicka, 2011). Place-dependent people evaluate the quality of the place they are attached to and compare it with alternative, yet comparable, places. Factors influencing this comparison include awareness, familiarity, mobility capacity, availability of resources, and types of needs of the occupants (Lewicka, 2011).

Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) suggest that the length of stay in a place and ties with neighbourhoods are predictors of place attachment and (im)mobility (Lewicka, 2011). Socio-economic and ethnic diversity in a neighbourhood is a predictor of lower place attachment at the neighbourhood level. However, at the city level, heterogeneity may lead to higher satisfaction levels and potentially higher place attachment (Lewicka, 2011). The most preferred scales for expressing place attachment among average people are the country level and neighbourhood/city level (Lewicka, 2011). While the elite tend to be cosmopolitan and mobile, place attachment does not necessarily differ between them and the majority of the population (Lewicka, 2011). Residence length, strength of social ties, and home ownership are positive predictors of place attachment. However, social and economic status, age, and education do not show a clear correlation with place attachment (Lewicka, 2011).

Places that elicit attachment have two forms of social capital: bonding capital (connections within similar groups) and bridging capital (connections between different social groups) (Lewicka, 2011). The extensiveness and richness of local social capital, along with a sense of security, are positive predictors of place attachment (Lewicka, 2011). Several physical factors influence place attachment, including quiet

areas, aesthetically pleasant buildings, green areas, lack of perceived incivilities, access to nature, housing quality, municipal services, household density, lack of pollution and disorder, and perceived control over the residence area (Lewicka, 2011).

4.4.2 Place attachment, staying and (im)mobility

Remaining in rural areas without experiencing out-migration has historically been perceived as being left-behind and indicative of a lack of progress (Stockdale et al., 2018). However, it is essential to recognize that staying in a rural area can be a deliberate and informed choice, rather than a consequence of failed migration (Tuan, 2014; Stockdale et al., 2018). Therefore, staying in a particular place should not be mistaken for immobility per se, as some individuals actively and consciously opt to remain, rather than merely experiencing a lack of movement (Coulter, van Ham, and Findlay, 2016; Morse & Mudgett, 2018). Indeed, staying can also be seen as voluntary immobility, if the individual has the capabilities to migrate, but the aspirations to stay in place, in contrast to involuntary immobility or entrapment (de Haas, 2021).

Indeed, staying in a place does not preclude mobility entirely, as it can manifest in various forms, such as short-distance commuting for work-related reasons or even long-distance commuting. The increasing prevalence of remote work has further highlighted this trend. Additionally, mobility may encompass leisure-oriented temporary movements, enabling individuals to embrace the advantages of multiple worlds (Morse & Mudgett, 2018).

To comprehend the decision to stay, it is crucial to adopt a life-course perspective, acknowledging the influence of personal, family-related, work-related, and community-related experiences, events, and influences. The notion of "linked lives" emphasizes the interconnected nature of these factors, shaping an individual's decision-making process (Stockdale et al., 2018).

Place attachment in relation to mobility has long been an area that has not received enough attention in research. Existing analyses have been conducted at various spatial scales, such as neighbourhoods, cities, regions, and countries, which makes comparisons challenging (Morse & Mudgett, 2018). Nonetheless, place attachment plays a crucial role in the decision of whether to stay or migrate. In rural areas, place attachment can involve a strong sense of belonging to outdoor places, property, and the landscape (Morse & Mudgett, 2018). Immobility has been linked to factors such as place attachment (Clark et al., 2017; Di Masso et al., 2019) and rootedness (Cooke, 2011; C. S. Fischer, 2002; Thomassen, 2021).

A research study conducted in Vermont found that contented stayers cited four main noneconomic reasons for staying: landscape, family, culture, and community (Morse & Mudgett, 2018). Place attachment is a significant factor influencing the decision to stay in a rural area, as highlighted in several studies (Glendinning et al., 2003; Kloep, Hendry, Glendinning, Ingebrigtsen, & Espnes, 2003; Leopold, Geissler,

& Pink, 2012; Looker & Naylor, 2009; Thissen, Droogleever Fortuijn, Strijker, & Haartsen, 2010; Stockdale et al., 2018).

Thomassen (2021) emphasizes the significant role that family and friends play in the immobility of young graduates residing in peripheral areas of the Netherlands. Their influence operates in multiple ways: (i) physical proximity, where the physical closeness of family and friends serves as an anchor, tying the young graduates to the peripheral area; (ii) behavioural influence, where the decisions of young graduates are influenced by the mobility experiences of their family and friends, with those having migrating family and friends being more likely to follow suit; and (iii) social network, where family and friends create a social network that incorporates young graduates into "linked lives" (Elder, 1994), preventing feelings of isolation and loneliness. Moreover, young graduates consider the benefits their family and friends also receive from their decision to stay (Thomassen, 2021). Additionally, immobility is associated with the presence of local social capital and ties (Blaauboer, 2011; David, Janiak, & Wasmer, 2010; P. A. Fischer & Malmberg, 2001; Mulder & Malmberg, 2014; Thomassen, 2021).

A study conducted in Spain (Thomassen et al., 2023) provides several pieces of evidence supporting the notion that strong ties to family and friends act as robust deterrents to migration. Particularly, the tie to family has a significant impact on women's migration decisions. Young adults are more influenced by ties with friends, while older individuals prioritize family ties. Being part of a family with a spouse and children decreases the inclination to migrate, as it would disrupt the settled family life and social relationships (Thomassen et al., 2023). The study highlights the influence of local capital, encompassing both human and social aspects, on migration decisions. This local capital includes social relationships, professional networks, knowledge of cultural traditions, investments in the local labour market, familiarity with the local landscape, and property ownership in the local housing market. The accumulation of such location-specific capital can lead to strong place attachment, creating local ties (Thomassen et al., 2023). People with strong ties to their residential environment exhibit a higher propensity to stay. These ties can be described as place attachment, encompassing links to family roots, positive relationships with neighbours, and a sense of community. Additional factors contributing to attachment are amenities, services, and the overall quality of life. Notably, this type of local tie seems to exert a more substantial constraint on migration for older individuals compared to younger ones. Families are also more influenced by these ties compared to singles or individuals living without other family members. Moreover, individuals with strong local social ties are less likely to migrate than those with weaker ties within the local environment. Additionally, if the environment aligns with an individual's birthplace, the propensity to migrate decreases (Thomassen et al., 2023). The study also finds that individuals with non-transferable jobs or high job satisfaction display a reduced propensity to move. Men attach higher importance to work-related ties compared to women, with these ties being more influential for those with stable jobs, permanent contracts, and self-employment (Thomassen et al., 2023).

Savage (2010) identifies several narratives of belonging, including "nostalgia" (staying in a place tied to one's past and memories), "dwelling" (staying in a familiar place), and "elective belonging" (choosing a place with symbolic meaning, leading people to move there). Even individuals born and raised in a rural area can experience elective belonging (Stockdale et al., 2018).

In their study on young adults residing in a small town in Lapland, Adams and Komu (2022) found that place attachment played a crucial role in determining their decisions regarding mobility. Place attachment was observed in two dimensions: attachment to the community and attachment to nature. Interestingly, this attachment was not solely linked to objectively desirable factors of the place but rather influenced by the personal and psychological characteristics of these young adults (Adams and Komu, 2022). The findings indicated that place attachment was a significant factor in their decision to stay and live in the area, even if it meant compromising on aspects like education and career opportunities. The strength of place attachment was rooted in a deep sense of community, where many young adults felt they could truly be themselves only within this environment. The strong bonds with family members also played a highly influential role in their decision-making process (Adams and Komu, 2022). The study highlighted that the sense of belonging to the community and a profound connection to nature were pivotal in shaping their immobility decisions. For these young adults, the small town in Lapland held an irreplaceable value that transcended material aspects. The emotional connection they felt to the community and nature outweighed other external considerations, making it the preferred place to call home (Adams & Komu, 2022). The research emphasized the importance of understanding the personal and psychological characteristics of individuals when examining immobility decisions. It shed light on the complexity of place attachment, revealing that the subjective and emotional elements can be just as influential as objective factors when it comes to determining where young adults choose to reside (Adams & Komu, 2022).

Box 4 - working definitions of place attachment

Academia	<p>Re-Place starts from the idea that territory is a network of places and that the place is the space of dwelling, production, consumption, of social relations, of diverse and overlapping mobilities, and of community development (Staniscia, 2003). In this intricate space, personal, group, and cultural processes take place (Altman & Low, 1992). Re-Place also starts from the idea that <i>place attachment</i> is based on the emotions and feelings of individuals who inhabit the places; the sense of attachment is influenced by individual personalities, personal beliefs, and knowledge of the places as well as lived experiences, and it manifests in concrete behaviours and actions (Altman & Low, 1992). The research of Re-Place fits into the ongoing international debate on how attachment to places influences decisions about (im)mobility and on the type of relationship that people with (and without) mobility experience have with the places they come from and the places where they live. The idea is to move beyond the dichotomous idea of mobility = lack of attachment to the place of origin, immobility = attachment to the place of origin, interpreting attachment as a dynamic and relational phenomenon in which place and individual intertwine and build together.</p>
Public administration / Third sector	<p>In the marginal areas that Re-Place focuses on, depopulation is one of the main issues that institutional representatives, public administrators, associations, and local organizations strive to address. Policies and actions may aim at retaining the original population, recovering those who have left, and attracting new residents by building or strengthening the sense of attachment. It has been shown that there are various factors that can elicit <i>place attachment</i>, some acting as ‘anchors’, others as ‘magnets’ (Lewicka, 2011). These factors can be supported by targeted public policies and community actions. Re-Place’s research positions itself within the international debate on policies for marginal areas, recognizing <i>place attachment</i> as one of the elements that can characterize them. It acknowledges the risk that policies emphasizing <i>place attachment</i> could rely on place identity as a repellent and exclusionary factor towards newcomers. Re-Place interprets eliciting <i>place attachment</i> in public policies and actions to strengthen the sense of belonging and community in a dynamic and inclusive manner for both old and new residents.</p>
Private stakeholders	<p>In the marginal European areas that Re-Place focuses on, the private sector is struggling, with few enterprises and few workers. In many areas, enterprises are tied to local resources – agriculture, tourism, and craftsmanship – while in a few others, they are linked to creative, innovative and high-tech sectors. The presence of highly specialized, skilled labour and people with entrepreneurial spirit is rare, given the relatively high average age and strong depopulation pressures. <i>Place attachment</i> of entrepreneurs and workers in businesses tied to local resources is an important factor for the development of these economic activities, as <i>place attachment</i> is also connected to knowledge of the territories and their potential. <i>Place attachment</i> is also important for innovative enterprises, which often need to attract and retain labour from outside the area. Re-Place’s research engages in the scientific debate that interprets enterprises, entrepreneurs, and workers in marginal areas as elements that contribute to the construction of place identity, thereby affecting <i>place attachment</i> of individuals.</p>

5

**“Re-Placing the
conceptual framework**

5. “Re-Placing” the conceptual framework

5.1 Beyond peripheral mobilities and left behind places

Erik Sacha, Daniel Göler, Maris Berzins, and Zaiga Krisjane

5.1.1 The role of spatial (im)mobilities

Population mobility has a profound effect on the spatial and temporal dynamics of a place. The Re-Place project aims to comprehend that locations are formed through mobile interactions that connect diverse groups and configurations (Cresswell, 2006). Rather than being a fixed entity, a location is a ‘constellation of processes’ that is continuously changing due to human mobility (Pierce et al., 2011). However, understanding the impact of mobility on a place cannot be achieved by studying singular types of mobility in isolation. Therefore, it is essential to understand the impact of mobility on locations by examining various types of mobility and their interactions. Spatial mobility encompasses a wide array of movements and their consequences across different geographical locations. The mobility paradigm emphasises that people's mobility practices are deeply embedded in their spatial, cultural, political, economic, social, and personal contexts (Manderscheid, 2013). This perspective highlights the intricate interplay between diverse yet intersecting mobilities and their impacts on various people and places globally (Sheller & Urry, 2006). The Re-Place project does not concentrate on the classification and categorisation of mobility, but rather on the diverse and evolving forms of dwelling that are intricately intertwined with the concept of place.

The concept of multiple mobilities can be used to understand the experiences of people living in left-behind areas by providing a lens through which to examine the intertwined and interdependent nature of human mobilities (Pike et al., 2023). To understand the dynamics of spatial mobilities and left-behind areas, it is essential to consider the multifaceted nature of human mobility and its impact on various aspects of society. Spatial mobilities encompass a wide range of movements, including daily commuting, residential mobility, international migration, and geographical and spatialised mobilities related to life transitions (Geist & McManus, 2008; Kesselring, 2014; Greene & Rau, 2018). This broad literature on 'multiple mobilities' emphasises the interconnectedness of different forms of mobility and their influence on social and economic structures (Kesselring, 2014). The ‘multiple mobilities’ encompass the interconnectedness of various forms of mobility, including physical, social, virtual, and imaginative mobilities. This underscores the complex and dynamic nature of human movement and the diverse factors that influence it. Gruber (2021) emphasises the importance of different types and forms of (im)mobility, the interconnectedness of mobile and immobile populations, and changes in aspirations and capabilities of life-course decision-making over time. Some scholars have expanded on this by demonstrating how spatial mobilities are interdependent with other forms of mobility, such as vertical mobilities, representational mobilities, and embodied experiences of mobility (Fortunati & Taipale, 2017). According to Kellerman (2016), it is crucial to recognise that the notion of mobilities goes beyond just physical movement and includes the complex

interplay between physical, imagined, social, and virtual mobilities, which deserves scholarly attention. Overall, the concept of ‘multiple mobilities’ underscores the interconnectedness of different forms of mobility and the complex relationships between mobility, place, and social dynamics. It also highlights the impact of mobility on marginalised or neglected communities, emphasising the need for a comprehensive understanding of the interconnected nature of human movement and its implications for various aspects of society.

The literature highlights the importance of socio-spatial exclusion and its impact on social and economic structures in relation to left-behind areas (Kühn, 2015; Pike et al., 2023). As a result, there is a need to examine the dynamics of (im)mobility at various scales and understand the experiences of individuals in these areas. This requires a focus on the everyday substantive forms of mobility that are crucial for comprehending movement in the contemporary world. Therefore, understanding non-migratory mobility is of particular importance. Digital nomadism has become a prominent trend in recent years and is characterised by individuals who work remotely while travelling to different locations (Aroles et al., 2020; Mancinelli, 2020). The locations chosen by digital nomads are not limited to urban areas, as rural areas are also potential destinations for digital nomad tourism (Aroles et al., 2023). “Zoomization” and “workation” are buzzwords for these trends. However, it is important to note that remote rural areas often lack the required digital connectivity, which increases the risk of these areas falling further behind in terms of accessibility to services (Salemink et al., 2017).

To gain a deeper comprehension of spatial (im)mobilities, particularly in areas that have been labelled as “left-behind places”, researchers can utilise various innovative methods that can reveal nuanced insights and enhance understanding.

- Digital ethnography: utilization of digital tools and multi-sited ethnography is frequently appealed to, and quite often practiced, in transnational migration studies, gaining insights into (im)mobility patterns and the underlying care practices (Boccagni, 2016; Chen, 2022). Throughout the project, Re-Place will compile a collective “archive” of images created by both researchers and participants (described in section 5.4.1 of this paper);
- Big Data analytics: leveraging large datasets and providing unprecedented opportunities for analysing and understanding peripheral mobilities in left-behind areas. This allows for the extraction of knowledge from large amounts of publicly accessible data, such as social media activity and social network data, which can serve as proxies for human mobility (Pucci et al. 2019, Cowie et al. 2020; Butzin & Flögel, 2023; McKay et al., 2023);
- Participatory mapping and GIS (Geographic Information Systems): limited mobility is closely connected to social exclusion requiring an in-depth analysis. Involving local

communities in mapping their own mobilities and activity spaces and integrating their practices into spatial analysis (Binder & Matern, 2020). Re-Place researchers will map and analyse strategies used by households in LBAs to gain a contextualised understanding of households' perceptions, livelihood strategies and micro-tactics for dealing with peripherality;

- Network analysis: applying network theory to understand the connections between different locations based on the flows of people. Existing research links socioeconomic decline and 'left behind' areas with out-migration and depopulation. Relatively few studies have reflected on the role of connectivity in the migratory system, and how this varies across groups and places to produce peripheralisation (Sanderson et al. 2023). Re-Places relational approach follows this understanding, as research is not only focused on place-based (im)mobility household experiences, but also considers multilocational and circular mobilities plus the experiences of those who have moved away (see section 5.3.2);
- Mobility biographies, intergenerational, and longitudinal studies: detailed qualitative research into individuals' life-long and intergenerational mobility patterns and interrelated personal, social, and economic factors influencing these trajectories. Previous research suggests that the life chances of children are partly determined by how the communities in which they live adapt to demographic and socioeconomic change. Some evidence suggests that children growing up in places left behind by today's economy experience lower levels of social mobility than adults (Conor et al. 2023). In each case study area, as part of the qualitative research agenda, Re-Place will conduct in-depth interviews with mobile households (those moving in and out of the LBAs) as well as with immobile households, to understand (im)mobility trajectories and the perceived impact of mobility at different levels (individual, household, and community) and across different life domains (economic, social, political and cultural).
- Village labs ensure that the results of previous research activities, participants' knowledge, experiences and visions will be mobilized to cocreate innovative policies on local development and well-being in the 12 LBAs.

These analytical approaches incorporate both qualitative and quantitative research methods, embracing the complexities of peripheral mobilities and left-behind areas. Furthermore, they can be tailored to address unique difficulties and circumstances in specific locations.

Box 5 - working definitions of spatial mobilities

<p>Academia</p>	<p>Studies on spatial or diverse mobilities will provide a wider holistic understanding of how mobilities impact social and economic life in left-behind areas. Spatial mobilities encompass a wide range of movements, including daily commuting, residential mobility, return, internal, circular mobility, international migration and geographical and spatialised mobilities related to life transitions (Geist & McManus, 2008; Kesselring, 2014; Greene & Rau, 2018). Focusing in on spatial mobilities/immobilities of the whole population rather than analysing migrant groups as the unit of analysis. The Re-Place project examines various types of mobility and their interactions. Rather than focusing solely on specific types of mobility, our project will delve into the diverse and evolving forms of dwelling intricately intertwined with the concept of place with aim of “demigranticisation” and overcoming the sedentary bias. (Dahinden, 2016). This innovative approach can be used to understand the experiences of people living in left-behind areas by providing a lens through which to examine human mobilities' intertwined and interdependent nature (Pike et al., 2023). The literature highlights the importance of spatial exclusion and its impact on social and economic structures in left-behind areas. As a result, there is a need to examine the dynamics of (im)mobility at various scales and understand the experiences of individuals in these areas. This requires a focus on the everyday substantive forms of mobility crucial for comprehending movement in the contemporary world.</p>
<p>Public administration / Third sector</p>	<p>Grasping the dynamics of spatial mobilities in left-behind areas hinges on a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of mobility and its far-reaching impact on various societal aspects.</p> <p>The approach followed in Re-Place suggests that spatial mobilities provide a more comprehensive basis for policies. For public administration and the third sector, spatial mobilities could improve: Population attraction, mobilities (digital, remote work, commuting as a way to retain population); Encouraging people to move or work remotely from rural or underpopulated areas, revitalizing local economies; Local governments can tailor services, infrastructure, and amenities if they have a good understanding of seasonal or commuting mobilities; New ways of thinking about regional development – rather than seeing exit/outmigration as negative, understanding the flow of people might provide new ways to rethink economic strategies (e.g. temporary, circular, or return migration).</p> <p>This encourages public administrators and policy makers to recognize that mobilities are diverse in space and time, and to understand their pivotal role in mitigating spatial exclusion.</p>
<p>Private stakeholders</p>	<p>Private stakeholders in rural areas can focus on practical implications. They should consider daily commuting, international and internal migration, lifestyle, return, temporary and seasonal migration, digital nomadism, and immobility decisions. By considering multiple forms of mobility, private stakeholders can attract and retain talent by offering remote or flexible work. Start-ups, innovations, and encouragement for new entrepreneurship might develop new businesses. Private stakeholders can also enhance social diversity and strengthen local communities by supporting local initiatives and resilience.</p>

5.1.2 Left-behindness beyond the levelling up policy context in UK

The political debate on how to revitalise “left behind” areas has received a lot of attention, particularly in the UK with the post-Brexit 'levelling up' agenda. The current "levelling up" policy in the UK dates back to

the Conservative Party's 2019 manifesto, in which it refers to infrastructure development, promoting innovation, improving employability, revitalisation of towns and cities as well as strengthening their local communities. Since then, "levelling up" has determined the course of the British government and further social and economic issues have been added to the agenda dealing with the emergence of so-called "left-behind places" (Martin et al. 2021, 17). In the absence of a clearly defined time frame, changing and all-encompassing priorities, "levelling up" has been criticized for becoming a symbolic policy (Jennings et al. 2021; Martin et al. 2021). Tomaney & Pike (2020) argue, the driving force behind these attempts to revitalise marginalised areas is electoral tactics rather than a genuine commitment to reducing long-term spatial and social inequalities (Tomaney & Pike 2020). The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) has aimed to provide a more precise definition of what "levelling up" means and a more tangible implementation until 2030 in its 2022 white paper "Levelling Up the United Kingdom". "Levelling up" seeks to *"end the geographical inequality"* by *"giving everyone the opportunity to flourish. It means people everywhere living longer and more fulfilling lives and benefitting from sustained rises in living standards and well-being"* (DLUHC 2022, xii). To achieve this goal six capitals (physical, human, intangible, financial, social and institutional) and their interplay will be promoted according to their existing spatial distribution, to enable people to stay in their community and to live a fulfilling life. The white paper outlines 12 missions to address social, economic, and institutional questions, from improving local public transport connectivity throughout the UK *"closer to the standards of London"* (DLUHC 2022, 120) to closing spatial gaps in well-being. However, some missions lack clear parameters and are broadly formulated, representing *"an evolution of existing policy"* (Fransham et al. 2023, 2343), predominantly aspects from the Industrial Strategy, which Nurse & Sykes (2020) criticized as *"place-blind in nature"* because it does not promote the endogenous potential of the places, but imposes the same development strategies for all, rather than a completely new approach.

The discourse about "left behind" areas extends beyond the UK and encompasses various dimensions of socio-spatial differentiation and territorial governance, including urban policy, economic disadvantage, political disillusionment, health-related quality of life, and educational outcomes (Pike et al., 2022). This underscores the need for policymakers to consider the broader societal implications of policies and addresses the intersecting inequalities that affect marginalised communities. The recent wave of populist discontent in Europe and North America has brought social and spatial inequalities to the forefront of political agendas. Areas that have been "left behind," particularly former industrial regions, have become a symbolic representation of areas of disadvantage and discontent (Hendrickson et al., 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Both urban and rural areas can be "left behind", often as a result of crises in agriculture and/or industry (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). The broad use of the concept implies that there are policy recommendations on several scales for different types of areas that have been "left behind". Re-Place's focus lies on the co-creation of local level policies, developed with the perspectives of people living within municipalities and local communities and those who have left these places. The reasons why people feel

“left-behind” in certain localities are not only to be found in present disparities or as an outcome of economic declining. The formation of left-behind areas follows a longer self-reinforcing process, closely linked to the emergence of collective embitterment among a significant share of the population after a main trigger event (Hannemann et al., 2023). To understand “left behind” areas and to develop realizable policies, both, a material and an emotional dimension of “left behind-ness” must be considered. Sacriston, a former mining village, provides a good example of how the remaking of social infrastructure can create positive effects, strengthen local communities, and show a way out of the decline (Tomaney et al., 2023).

Understandings of what is meant by “left behind” areas and spatial disparities vary widely across national discourses, but a visible return of public interest in territorial questions is common in many European countries (Desjardins & Estèbe, 2022; Leyshon, 2021). A prime example of a place-based policy in the European context is Italy’s “National Strategy for Inner Areas”, which aims to promote “development and territorial cohesion to counteract marginalisation and demographic decline” within peripheral and sparsely populated areas (Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale, 2019). Another example with similar aims is the Portuguese “Programa de Valorização do Interior”, which replaced the National Programme for Territorial Cohesion. It aims to promote territorial and economic cohesion by leveraging endogenous resources, attracting investment, retaining populations, enhancing the competitiveness of inland territories, and fostering cross-border cooperation. It prioritizes actions to revitalize interior regions through integrated public policies that encompass innovation, digitalization, sustainability, and social inclusion according to specific territorial contexts. 5The current debate on “abgehängte Regionen” (suspended regions) in Germany already had a prelude in the discussion on so-called structurally weak regions, in western Germany mainly former mining and industrial, predominantly urban areas and in eastern Germany mainly rural areas. A more recent development, especially in the media discourse is to explain the high levels of support for the populist to extreme right-wing party AfD (Alternative for Germany) with voters in rural eastern Germany feeling left behind. Indeed, a high degree of rurality, a lower middle income and poor access to infrastructure facilities significantly favour votes for the anti-migration party, particularly in eastern Germany (Stroppe & Jungmann, 2022). Germany’s government does not have a recent equivalent of the UK’s ‘levelling up’ agenda, but it has comprehensively adapted the country’s main regional policy instrument, the “Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ‘Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur’” (joint task ‘Improvement of the regional economic structure’) in 2022. The prevention of spatial inequality is anchored in the German constitution with the goal of “equal living conditions”.

At the national level in Europe, five trends in regional policy can currently be observed according to Bachtler & Downes (2023, 39): *“a) initiatives to combine sustainability with competitiveness and innovation; b) promotion of more place-based approaches; c) a greater emphasis on vulnerable or marginalised regions; d) policy intervention to improve quality of life and access to public services; and e) ongoing reform of governance and institutional structures and capacity building at regional and local levels”*. Most

European countries tend to focus more on promoting rural areas, with Finland being an exception (Bachtler & Downes, 2023). This turnaround is in contrast to the policies of previous decades. Spatial policies on the national states level in Europe and North America since 2008 can be summarised by three main types: *“reinforced and continued metropolitanisation; the extension of competitiveness policies to smaller cities and towns; and, new placed-based industrial and infrastructure policies”* (MacKinnon et al. 2023: 5). The latter can be seen as an attempt to respond to the emerge of 'left behind' areas. Since 2008, although European countries and other parts of the global North have become more economically similar in terms of GDP, regional disparities within these countries have increased (OECD, 2023). In the current early phase of development, these new placed-based industrial and infrastructure policies are ambivalent in themselves, because on the one hand they seek to counter the consequences of globalism and neo-liberalism, while on the other they continue to uphold the mantra of growth and competitiveness (MacKinnon et al, 2023). In the past, the development of spatial policies influenced by neoliberalism, like the metropolitanisation, was driven by mutually influencing actors and their agendas at the national level but also at the regional and, above all, the supranational EU level (Lang & Török, 2017). Similar to national policies, the current discourse about 'left behind areas' affects policies at the EU level. Although cohesion policy already provides tools to tackle territorial disparities, the new Green Deal also promises that *“no person and no place will be left behind”* (European Commission 2021) during the current green transition. The green transition and the policy tools to implement it risk creating new territorial disparities and widening others. Non-metropolitan areas, especially those characterized by industry and agriculture, which are already "left behind", are highly vulnerable to the consequences of the green transition and therefore run the risk of falling further behind the better prepared metropolises (Rodríguez-Pose & Bartalucci, 2023). In this context Rodríguez-Pose & Bartalucci (2023) highlight a potential *“green' discontent”* that could arise. However, current crises and upheavals can also benefit 'left behind' areas. The covid-19 pandemic has opened development opportunities for some “left behind” areas, e.g. through new forms of work or digitalization, and enabled a change in perception of these places (Almeida & Daniel 2023). But again, while these crises may have provided opportunities for some of the 'left behind' areas, there is a general threat of deepening inequalities. The diffusion of remote work during the pandemic was very unequal across Europe, with a particular increase in cities and metropolitan areas, as local industries in these areas are currently better suited to remote working (Özgüsel et al. 2023).

Overcoming the material disadvantages, the negative emotional state and the external stigma of being “left behind”, that define our research areas, is possible. This requires the participation of residents in co-creating policies that benefit “left behind” areas. How should policies be designed to counter spatial disparities and the growing discontent? A fundamental step is to overcome the *“city centrism”* (Martin et al. 2021: 117) that has prevailed over spatial policies in past decades. “Left behind” areas in Europe are heterogenous and there is no universal policy that applies to every “left behind” area. In the context of the “levelling up” debate, economic development policies are predominant. Common sense is a rejection of

purely top-down approaches, “levelling up” needs to be done “within” the regions and can be achieved through the improvement of different factors as “*scale and longevity of investment, financial management, collaboration, place attractiveness, universities, clusters and innovation, transport and digital infrastructure, skills and future sectors*” (Taylor, 2022: 66). Place-based policies are “*public efforts to boost the development of specific places by taking into account people’s values, local assets and knowledge as well as locally derived visions and intentions*” (Sotarauta, 2020: 3). How to create place-based policies that meet the specific needs of places is demonstrated by Abreu et al. 2023 in a “capability-approach for a regional policymaking process”. This approach stems from four critiques of existing policies, which the authors argue first do not focus on actual opportunities for residents, but only on intermediate goals, such as improved infrastructure, second are often organised top down and from a far centre, producing information asymmetries, third, the missing agency and the failure to ensure transparency of the authorities and processes reduces the support of the population for the political programmes and fourth the methods to create those programmes are orientated on averages and blind regarding impacts on vulnerable groups. Creating policies should therefore consider the impact on various groups and consider how location-based resources can be converted into desired outputs. As place-based policies focus only on specific areas, lammarino et al. (2019) propose a place-sensitive policy approach to facilitate developments across all types of places at all scales, according to their needs. To foster economic development, they call for specific activities for regions according to their level of development, for EU’s low-income regions measurements reaching from the investment in infrastructure, active labour market policies and reforms to improvements in government and strengthening civil society (ibid.). For EU’s middle-income regions, especially those in “middle income trap” lammarino (2019) points out potentials in actions like stressing significant investments in re-skilling, increasing attractiveness of selected inward capital flows, or repairing social capital to overcome mistrust. The feeling of being left behind does not always have to go hand in hand with material development, as for Germany in the last 20 years the economic disparities on district level has been reduced (OECD 2023), but the discussion about “left behind” areas, especially rural areas has expanded (Deppisch 2021). Policies countering “left-behindness” therefore should not solely concentrate on economic development but also consider the social and emotional state of local communities and work on an emotional-narrative level, to avoid “emotional lock-ins” (Hannemann et al. 2023).

5.1.3 Left-behindness and questions of hierarchical fields of power, re-scaling, and embeddedness

Re-Place aims to examine the interplay between development, (im)mobility, and place attachment regarding 'left behind' areas beyond the national framework, while taking into account regional and local peculiarities of development paths and the perceptions of the local population. Through various participatory methods, which will be described in the following subsections, territorial disparities can be examined from the perspective of the inhabitants, without imposing “left behindness” as a preconceived

concept on them as "left behind" also reflects a question of power and scale. In the academic discourse, different areas have been categorised as "left behind places", ranging from the small national states through regions, cities and towns down to the neighbourhood level (Bolton et al. 2019; Taylor 2022; Tomaney et al. 2023). Unlike most other research projects, Re-Place adopts the term 'left-behind areas' rather than 'places' because left-behindness is made on different scales and we want to avoid softening the concept of place. Scale is not a neutral, predetermined research instrument, but is itself subject to social construction, with "*the social and the spatial are mutually constitutive*", clearly evident in the example of the formation of the European Union as a new governmental scale (Leitner, 2004: 237). According to Sammers (2010: 44), scaling and rescaling are two contrary processes:

"[S]caling refers to the ordering of sociospatial units within multiple hierarchies of power. Rescaling refers to a reordering of these relationships. Taken together the terms scaling and rescaling serve as a conceptual shorthand that allows us to speak of the intersection between two processes: restructuring, including movements of various forms of capital, and the reorganization of the relationships of power between specific sociospatial units of governance. The term "scalar positioning" refers to the intersection of restructuring and rescaling processes at a particular moment of time".

While neoliberalism itself has led to a readjustment of scales (Brenner, 2019), its current crisis might offer a similar potential. The open and to be examined issue concerning 'left behind' areas in general, and in Re-Place non-metropolitan peripheral areas in particular, is whether they are currently at the beginning of a repositioning in their favour induced by policies to address territorial inequalities and the geographies of discontent, such as "levelling up". The scalar positioning of a city has an impact on its inhabitants, both those who have lived there for a long time and newcomers, and vice versa. Inspiration for research on mobilities and non-metropolitan 'left behind' areas in the context of scale can be found in research on migration and cities, where migrants themselves became scalemakers (Glick Schiller, 2012).

The previous research by Massey (2005) assert that places are interconnected, rather than confined within containers, and these interconnections are examined in Re-Place project through a comparative relational method that considers translocal contexts. The integrated approach to place-based mobilities in Re-Place addresses the need in migration studies to move beyond methodological nationalism and to study the interconnections between human mobility and specific locations (Çağlar & Glick Schiller, 2018). Furthermore, our focus on all individuals living in one place –whether movers or stayers– contributes toward overcoming the sedentary bias in migration studies by focusing not only on migrants but on immobilities (Schewel, 2020). As such, we will conceptualize left-behind non-metro areas as being relational nodes where local, national, international mobilities depart from or intersect in. Moreover, as McKay (2006: 201) has shown, the lived experience of locality is place-based without being place-bound

meaning that the family webs, livelihood strategies and social networks of residents may be multi-locational. As Çağlar and Glick Schiller (2018) argue, what happens in places is formed in relation to actors' "reach" to other actors across socio-spatial spheres of practice that possess different amounts of power. So, while our analytical framework is place-based, it is not place bound as we are interested in how places are positioned within different scales of power and how different types of mobile people and non- migrants develop multilocal and circulatory practices to build resilience. Understanding peripheral or left- behind areas means, as Charmillot and Dahinden (2021: 2) put it, "emphasizing their critical embeddedness in external dynamics within national, European and transnational orders". The place- mobility lens is an alternative epistemological approach that will lead to a more integrative understanding of how diverse mobilities linking different scales can cumulatively contribute to place-making and different local development outcomes. Translocal approaches (Brickel & Datta, 2011) -step back from the bifurcated way of thinking about places as either origins or destinations and provides fertile ground to rethink the harried brain drain versus brain gain argument. The translocal framework will deliver new ideas on brain circulation, to promote new practices to overcome the deskilling and labour exploitation that is characteristic of the experiences of some mobile workers. It also focuses on the exchange of ideas, social capital and livelihood strategies across places. A multi-local perspective in terms of policymaking provides new challenges, as while multilocality and mobility can potentially empower individuals and families to build rural resilience, local governments rarely possess the tools to harness the benefits it offers or deal with the challenges it presents (Landau, 2018: 216).

5.1.4 Analysis of the impacts and (im)mobility transformations through intersectional and gender+ approaches

Amandine Desille

In the Re-Place proposal, we have suggested that "gender alone is not sufficient to understand emplacement as individuals negotiate complex identities in their everyday encounters and perceptions of their own living conditions" (Action Plan). "Feminist research started with the assumption that mainstream or traditional approaches to research have historically excluded or distorted the experiences of women used male norms to define normality" (Hawkey & Ussher, 2022), yet the idea of feminist research is not to replace male norms by White, privileged, body-abled female norms. Rather than conceptualizing "woman" as a "unitary category, negating differences between women and the intersection of identities – including ethnicity, sexuality, disability, and social class" (ibid.), new proposals have been made to consider this intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991) in order to incorporate epistemic and hermeneutical justice. This is why in recent years, feminist research has expanded to include struggles against "all forms of abjection and abuse" (Harding, 2018): sexuality and gender-diverse people, migrants and refugees, individuals who are socio-economically deprived, ill or disabled people (Hawkey & Ussher, 2022), but also to produce critical knowledge on masculinities. The Re-Place consortium is therefore committed to "asking intersectional

questions and analysing intersectional data” (ibid.). In the case of migration and mobilities studies, as Amelina (2022) argued, we are “doing migration” as a process that is based on gendered, racialized and classed knowledge. She added “It goes without saying that these analyses to detect differences in the way individuals are transformed into migrants at various levels of the social organization need to be *sensitive to intersectional forms of knowledge* (Collins, 1986). Such intersectional knowledge patterns are visible in the hierarchies created between actors who are labelled “migrants” in (historically specific and changeable) gendered, ethnicized/racialized and classed ways and those who are not (Amelina 2017)” (Amelina, 2022). At the moment of starting qualitative fieldwork, we propose to analyse multiple types of (im)mobilities and intersections with inequalities related with gender, disability, age, ethnicity, nationality, migration status, religion, sexual orientation, and economic status. “The primary goal of this project is to develop policies that harness the benefits of mobility to counter brain drain and labour exploitation, build human capital and promote rural development and sustainability. These different policy areas need to contemplate diversity and intersectionality to ensure that they do not have unequal outcomes” (Re-Place Action Plan). Beyond the intersectional lens adopted to prepare and conduct fieldwork, our positionality as researchers should also be challenged: How epistemic privilege can play out in our research? Following Angela Kocze’s chapter “Nothing about us without us” on Roma studies in Europe, we ask ourselves how we inquire “at the margins” when we have the privilege to go back to the centre once the fieldwork is completed. A few guidelines are in the working, notably on the (de)construction of (ascribed) categories, the time we spend in communities and the connections we form, the (un)necessity to translate collected data to “academic language”, and/or the support we can provide in creating space for local knowledge and expertise, etc.

5.2 Beyond GDP? Measuring the (lack of) neo-endogenous development in LBAs

Amandine Desille and Jennifer McGarrigle

Developed in the 17th century in England, but only widely adopted after the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is currently the most used measure of national wealth. Yet GDP is only a monetary measure of the market value of all the final goods and services produced in a specific time period by a country. Hence the last decades, there was tremendous effort to produce alternative measures of growth and development.

The State of Bhutan has popularized the Gross National Happiness, developed from 1972 on. As others in the prolific field of “happiness economics” (see Graham, 2021), happiness indicators usually rely on surveys and subjective assessment by a representative sample of nationals. Other alternative macroeconomics indicators exist such as the most well-known and composite Human Development Indicator, launched by Mahbub ul-Haq in 1990. The HDI considers part of the assets mentioned here above, as it adds to the GDP a measure of health (life expectancy at birth) and education (mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school

entering age). But many more were developed since then. One can look at the European Commission's initiative "Beyond GDP" or a similar "Beyond GDP" initiative by the OECD to get a grasp of the extent of initiatives at global, European, regional, national, civil society level to create and sustain environmental indicators, enlarged GDP indicators, social indicators and well-being indicators.

The Re-Place project aims at developing an indicator of human development, and this with the objective of developing "empirical and conceptual tools to advance more complex understandings of development pathways and mobility in areas classed as left-behind" (see action description, 2022). Two quantitative methods are foreseen in the project: a typology based on i) a Local Human Development Index that focuses on community capitals; and ii) data gathered through a large-scale representative online population survey at the national level in Germany, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Spain. The second is more obvious in its attempt to measure the subjective perception of place attachment, well-being and mobility-based development of a large sample of residents. Let us elaborate instead on the reasons why it is necessary to develop a new indicator.

We suggest that the Local Human Development Indicator (LHDI) developed by the Re-Place consortium will overcome several existing pitfalls: a measure of *local* human development instead of national (or regional); the reestablishment of *assets* rather liabilities in measuring development; and the considering of *mobilities* both out-going and in-coming, too often thought of as a consequence rather than a drive of (lack of) development. Further desk-based data collection will allow to consider time to select areas the project will focus on. In fact, Re-Place factors in *decline over time* in the qualitative approach introduced later in the working paper. This historical approach enables to qualitatively understand what Tomaney et al. (2023) refer to as "the making, unmaking and remaking of Social Infrastructure". Finally, we aim at including a *gender analysis*.

A local or subnational measure. A great number of indicators are developed at the national level, without regional or local disaggregated data. This is the case of the well-being index in Portugal. Even when disaggregated data is available, it is often problematic as the indicators were developed following a logic of methodological nationalism: using the same formula at regional or local levels do not always reflect development disparities. For instance, Jeroen Royer (2023) looks into "suspended regions" in Germany. When trying to pinpoint the location of these peripheral regions, he and his colleagues found mostly rural areas. That contradicted their assumptions that many urban areas would also suffer marginalization. It is only when they split rural and urban areas for their computation that they eventually ended up with similar amounts of rural and urban "suspended regions". In fact, marginalisation proved different in rural areas – the population was older, and less active than in urban areas encountering similar socio-economic challenges, and the educational levels of the rural and urban marginalized areas' population was also different, with more holders of vocational degrees in rural areas. In the LHDI method brief (Sandu et al.

2023), we have shown that earlier attempts were made to adapt the HDI for measuring human development at the local level. Moreno et al. (2023) highlight one such attempt, called HDI-2, tailored for assessing human development in certain French regions and cities. HDI-2 retained the original three dimensions and calculation method of the UNDP's HDI but with modifications. While HDI-2 was found effective in developed countries for comparing sub-national units, it faced critiques: "(1) the index did not reflect human development per se, but rather disparities on the three dimensions of health, knowledge, and income, (2) economic development, education, and health system are the responsibility of the State and less under local arbitration, and finally that (3) there is an amount of subjectivity in the choice of data, methods of normalization and aggregation (Moreno et al.: 12-13)" (Sandu et al. 2023). Re-Place's LHDI addresses some of these issues. Building a LHDI needs to allow for a fair comparison across localities. We also argue that this comparability potential is needed at international level. This is why, within the framework of Re-Place, a LHDI is developed with data collected at LAU level across the six countries.

Basing her argument on her work in the region of Harmanli and Haskovo, a border region of Bulgaria, Krasteva (2023) asserted that "Remote places can be reconceptualized as people's vital and multifaceted worlds of experience, grounding their future in the diversity of their cultural and positional resources, values, and potential, as well as the basis for place-sensitive and place-based policies. The restoration of places and spaces to people affords an opportunity for territorial equity and trans-local solidarity." (p. 98). Here, it is the resources or assets, or capital of a particular place that can be harnessed for development and solidarity. This is what we will address in this next section.

Assets. Commenting on the GDP as a measure of wealth, Stiglitz et al. (2018) argued: "Today, structures (bridges, buildings, etc.), equipment (machines), research and development spending, land and subsoil assets are all within the asset boundary of national balance sheets (although rarely fully measured). Other assets could be brought into those boundaries, for instance human capital – the result of expenditures on education and training – or functioning ecosystems that may have been helped by expenditure on the environment. Most health expenditures, especially on children, should also be included as investments." Beyond GDP measures have tried to include a wider range of assets to better inform strategies of local and regional development. Conventional strategies of development tend to focus on the "hard infrastructures" of innovation and business growth. They need to be complemented with a renewed focus on strengthening place identity, wellbeing, social innovation, and community development to "cultivate" rather than "engineer" the human potential of LBAs (MacKinnon et al. 2021; Wirth et al. 2016). With Re-Place, local areas or communities are considered "community capital structures" (Sandu et al, 2023: 12). The LHDI aims at measuring three types of assets or capital - economic-material capital; human capital; and health capital.

The OECD in its publication *beyond GDP* (Stiglitz et al., 2018) included a section on “the measurement of economic downturns” to which we refer here. Although Stiglitz et al. (2018) assess the erosion of these assets during economic recession at the *national* level, their analysis is still relevant to understand the impact of economic decline on human development. For instance, at the human capital level, the lower wages and higher unemployment experienced by new graduates who entered the labour market during recessions permanently affect their careers, they argue (ibid.). It is also suggested that loss of jobs has a more significant impact on wellbeing than loss of income. Therefore, simply making up for loss of income will not restore individual wellbeing. Areas affected by economic downturns will also experience a regression in the state of knowledge (ibid.) as public education expenditure, investment in research are affected; while bankruptcies lead to a destruction of institutional knowledge. The authors also argue that economic downturns lead to the worsening of health and mental health, measured with cutbacks in health services, or even higher number of individuals on prescription pain medication (ibid.).

Economic downturns affect social capital too, and notably trust. The authors propose to look at trust in the labour market, but most interestingly for us here, trust in government is a measure too. Indeed, this could be paralleled with the “geography of discontent” developed by Rodríguez-Pose in 2016 (see first section of this paper). In a working paper reflecting on the Whole-Com project, Schiller et al. (2023) made the hypothesis that “Economically Stagnating/Left-behind Localities” would have disengaged and reactive local actors, restrictive and exclusionary policies, and regular anti-immigrant mobilizations. Yet, “many of these localities have a more mixed situation as regards integration policies and availability of engaged municipal actors.” (ibid. 2023: 20). In that sense, LBAs might actually implement policies favourable to mobilities, and to diversity in their community. This can also be the beginning of a virtuous circle: Oxford Consultants for Social Inclusion (OCSI) and Local Trust have published a report on Left-Behind in the UK (2019) and they state: “One very interesting finding is the strong association between a community’s position on the community needs index and the leave vote. The correlation is much stronger than between deprivation and the leave vote. This suggests that civic assets, connectedness and an engaged community are key building blocks to unite communities, and may reinforce the stake people feel they have in the country’s political and economic future.” In the piece “Epilogue: Chicken or Egg? The Role of Newcomer Migrants in the Revitalization of ‘Left-Behind’ Areas”, Zoomers argued that “Although they are overlooked by national governments and receive little or no public funding and suffer from outmigration and ageing, there are multiple cases where the left-behinds and the newcomers have been able to fight declining levels of wellbeing. Such cases show the potential of remote, often forgotten, areas to become the cradle for new citizen initiatives focusing on providing care, maintaining biodiversity and/or developing new sources of income”.

Today there exists no indicator of left-behindness. As we will show in the next paragraph, the typology of Velthuis et al. (2023) have shown immense progress in that direction. The asset-based LHDI we are

developing could potentially close some gaps too. It uses some traditional measures, such as income per capita. But it also includes living space, energy consumption, internet connections, and standardized mortality rate at LAU level to account for social and human capital (Sandu et al. 2023). Further variables are included, not in the actual computation of the LHDI but as related measures: we explore the links between the GDP per capita (at NUT3 level) as percentage of EU GDP, the distance to a functional urban centre, the nature of the settlement (urban, mostly urban, rural) and the LHDI. The employment rate by sector was also used to see the links with the LHDI in some partner countries. Measures of out/in migration are also explored in terms of links with the LHDI (ibid.). The Re-Place project will strive to unveil the relation between left-behindness, the erosion of assets/political neglect and the potential for neo-endogenous development.

Decline over time. In fact, when we consider time, and decline over time, we assume that these assets suffer erosion. MacKinnon et al. (2022) have defined left-behindness as a “combination of economic disadvantage, lower living standards, population loss/contraction/low-growth, a lack of infrastructure and political neglect and disengagement”, highlighting not only poor socio-economic performance but also a temporal factor, a neglect, that has led to the departure of investments and inhabitants.

Yet most works found on left-behindness simply use existing macroeconomics indicators of inequality over time and compare the changes. We have found that Gini coefficient was often used to measure inequalities and their evolution overtime. Even in the historical work of Amy Thompson who assesses multiscale inequality in modern and ancient Maya communities in Southern Belize (2023), Gini is used to show that modern Maya communities are more equal. In a more contemporary setting, Joel Suss (2021) also used Gini at neighbourhood level to show inequalities in the UK. But he confronts this data with houses values to measure *perception* of inequalities in the UK. An exception is the work of Velthuis et al. (2023) who elaborated a much more ambitious tool, factoring in time. The measure of left-behindness considers economic indicators, that is: regional gross domestic product (GDP) per head in 2018 and the long-run economic growth; and growth in GDP per head since 1991. This enables to see change between 1991 and 2018. Economic indicators also include employment growth over the period 1991–2017 and industrial employment loss (or gain) over the period 1991–2017. Demographic indicators include average annual rate of net migration over the five-year period from January 2014 to January 2019 (this shorter range of years is due to availability of data at European level); the average annual rate of population growth from 1991 to 2018; old-age dependency ratio; and a proxy indicator of youth migration. Social indicators used by Velthuis and colleagues are the estimated at-risk-of-poverty rates; and the travel times to supermarkets and convenience stores. Collected data was then compiled to create six clusters, as already described in section 4.1.1 of this paper.

The urge to tackle left-behindness is concerned with the fact that left-behindness have very long-lasting effects. Effects that Dylan Connor (2023) calls “scarring effects”. By checking children from left behind places and their incomes today, they see that they are persistent penalties among LBAs’ outmigrants which indeed suggest “scarring”. This is backed by the OCSI report (2019): “The research described in this report was commissioned by Local Trust from OCSI. It suggests that a lack of places to meet (whether community centres, pubs or village halls); the absence of an engaged and active community; and poor connectivity to the wider economy - physical and digital – make a significant difference to social and economic outcomes for deprived communities. Deprived areas which lack these assets have higher rates of unemployment, ill health and child poverty than other deprived areas. *And they appear to be falling further behind them.*” (our emphasis). In another example, Rachel Pain (2019) considers the long-term dispossession of Horden, a former pit village in County Durham in North-East England, “involving the slow violence of cumulative events from the loss of mining industry to the local council’s sale of formerly publicly- owned social housing. Drawing on feminist and post-colonial theories of power which connect intimate and collective experiences, such cycles of both fast and slow changes – violence in this reading – are understood to become hard wired in such places; positioned as *chronic urban trauma* (our emphasis).

For this, comparison over time is hence necessary. Apart from the desk-based data collection we mentioned above, the large-scale survey to be implemented will introduce questions related to time, to pre/post COVID professional and residential situations and so forth.

Mobilities. The issue of “population loss/contraction/low-growth” indicated by MacKinnon (2022) and affecting left-behind areas is not included in most indicators, nor the settlement of newcomers (either nationals or international migrants). If it is more common sense to assimilate LBA with out-migration, previous research has shown that even peripheral non-metropolitan areas host a share of migrant residents, oftentimes because of specific dispersion policies made by the central administration (see Desille, 2019; 2022 in the case of Israel or Portugal; Glorius et al. (2020) in Germany; Darling (2020) in the UK... etc). Within the smaller corpus of literature on migration outside urban centres and in rural areas, attention has homed in on voluntary mobility types too. Some examples include, “The Back-to- the-Land Movement” (Jacobs, 1997), in-migration (Stockdale, 2016; Kordel et al. 2018), every day and virtual mobilities (Milbourne & Kitchen, 2014), youth mobilities (Farrugia, 2016), lifetime stayers (Erickson, et al. 2017) or the new geography of agricultural labour migration (King, et al. 2021). This demonstrates the many ways of being mobile and different motivations for moving to non-metropolitan places, such as the search for temporal and seasonal work in tourism and agriculture, the growing number of people who move for lifestyle related reasons as seniors, retired people, second homeowners or remote workers escaping the city.

While recent, the literature on LBAs is burgeoning and covers different tendencies and debates. Yet, there is less known about the impact of exit – whether on local communities or outgoing individuals – or of incoming mobilities. There is some evidence that moving down the economic escalator may well represent an opportunity to “enact middleclass lifestyles affordably” (Goodwin-Hawkins & Dafydd Jones, 2021: 1) in line with earlier work on counter-urbanisation (Fielding, 1982; Halfacree, 2008). The alternative development agenda, which inspires the Re-Place proposal, aims to encourage new ways of thinking about the mobility-development nexus by focusing on harnessing the assets and knowledge present in diversifying places. The LHDI will provide information on left-behindness and out/in migration, and the large-scale survey will provide further information on mobility patterns among residents of LBA. Evidence that we will then use to inform policies.

Gender analysis. Mobilities and migrations are a gendered process. Indeed, “feminist scholarship shows that gender – that is, the social and cultural ideas, displays, and practices of masculinity and femininity – organizes and shapes our opportunities and life chances” (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Cranford, 2006). Despite the fact that gender has been widely recognised as “an organising principle of social life”, it has encountered indifference at best, if not resistance in migration studies (ibid.). As Hondagneu-Sotelo and Cranford argue, the obligation to explicitly include a gender approach in our research projects have too often translated in a “add and stir” approach, which means that “women are ‘added’ as a variable to inserted and measured”. We believe however that gender has an impact on mobilities which themselves impact social relations. It means that we do not solely mean to look at women’s participation in the workforce, access to decision-making processes, care burdens, salary levels compared with men, access to healthcare, etc., although those are crucial to study especially when we see that there is evidence that it has exacerbated during Covid-19 pandemic. But we also ambition to identify and understand masculinity norms and how they relate to the shifting economic, social and political environment in LBAs. In fact, the piece of Bromley-Davenport et al. (2019) in post-Brexit England show that economic stagnation and the experience of different forms of marginality by older working-class white men led to a nostalgia for times past and a mistrust of political elites amongst this cohort. Incorporating gender dimensions will be achieved through the analysis of secondary data and the collective preparation of an analytical framework and shared research guidelines and methods. Gender training with external experts is also foreseen during the first year of the project. And gender dimensions will also be incorporated in the two quantitative methods we use: the analytical and sampling frameworks used for the elaboration of the LHDI, and the primary data collected through the Re-Place survey. In the latter, gender is an important sampling criterion to ensure representativity.

Box 6 - working definitions of a Gender+ approach

<p>Academia</p>	<p>Firstly, the Re-Place research consortium recognises that gender is “an organising principle of social life” (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Cranford, 2006) and hence will seek to incorporate gender dimensions (identities, functions, and norms) in the research process, from the analysis of secondary data to sampling, and analysis of qualitative data. Secondly, the project does not merely contemplate gender, but we propose to analyse multiple types of (im)mobilities and intersections with inequalities related with gender, disability, age, ethnicity, nationality, migration status, religion, sexual orientation, and economic status. Thirdly, our positionality as researchers should also be challenged in order to incorporate epistemic and hermeneutical justice. Instead of epistemic privilege, we propose to adopt a posture of “systemic openness” where we build capacities to produce and share knowledge, where we learn and imagine alternative futures together, and federate knowledge. While applying collaborative methodologies, the inclusion of a wider diversity of residents – following gender identity, age, level of education, ethnic and racial self-identification, migration experience, sexual orientation, and more - has the potential to “identify, uproot and transform power relations” (Tant & Jiménez Thomas Rodriguez, 2022) present in local policymaking, and to engage residents.</p>
<p>Public administration / Third sector</p>	<p>The adoption of a Gender+ approach in public administration has meant a shift in diversity and inclusion policies towards a more generalized approach that merges migration-related agendas with broader issues of anti-discrimination, women's emancipation, and LGBTQI+ empowerment (see Schiller et al. 2023).</p>
<p>Private stakeholders</p>	<p>The adoption of a Gender+ approach for private sector organizations moves toward an intersectional model of gender equality to create more inclusive and nuanced policies workplaces and business practices.</p>

5.3 "Well-being" as a “demigrantised” perspective on “integration”

Amandine Desille, Astrid Safina and Jennifer McGarrigle

5.3.1 Demigrantising migration research project; re-migrantising social sciences

In 2016, Janine Dahinden published her now seminal piece “A plea for the ‘de-migrantisation’ of research on migration and integration” in the journal *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. With this, she responded to a series of criticisms against methodological nationalism and a narrow ethnic lens of migration, which, in the late 1980s, gave rise to transnational studies; and the shift towards an interest in supranational and local governance of migration. A simplistic interpretation of “demigrantising” would be that, since migration and integration research is “not only an essential part of [the] institutionalized migration apparatus, but

also causally articulated through this paradigm of normalized difference”, migration and integration research ought to be ultimately dismissed. However, Dahinden does not suggest throwing the baby out with the bath water, so-to-speak. Not producing knowledge on migration, ethnicity or race is even more perilous as it may lead to increased inequalities and resentment (see the case of France - Magazzini, 2021). On the contrary, she wrote that “There is no doubt that migration and ethnicity can be important criteria of difference –whether concerning rights, belonging, policy or social actions, affiliations, discrimination and so on– because, ultimately, the nation-state migration apparatus and this normalization discourse create specific social realities and inequalities” (2016). Scholten (2020) reminds us that migration has become a structural component of our societies. In his opinion, “dealing with complex issues such as migration and diversity means that such issues should become part of almost everything we do, of how we think and of the structures and institutions we reproduce”, hence migration and diversity shall be “mainstreamed” into governance systems, as much as gender and environmental concerns are. As Dahinden proposed in the conclusion of her piece, “a call to ‘migrantise’ social sciences in general while ‘de-migrantising’ migration studies seems justified”.

Several practical proposals have been brought forward to achieve such a goal (Dahinden, 2016; Scholten, 2020; Magazzini, 2021; Amelina, 2022). Dahinden’s first proposal is to change the categories and concepts of analysis that participate in reproducing the migration apparatus. Integration is one of the most criticized concepts the last decade, as it almost entirely shifts the responsibility of this so-called integration to the persons who migrated themselves (Schinkel, 2018). In the American context, the calls for a recognition of this bias have fallen into the pejorative-connotated field of “identity politics”, yet, as Magazzini (2021) argues, the rise of “identity politics,”

“is invariably grounded on the assumption that past politics (one dominated exclusively by white men) was not rooted in identity—that ‘identity’ is an attribute that does not apply to whites. From the perspective of the still dominant framework that sees the ‘Default Man’ (western, middle-class, white heterosexual male) as the benchmark of what it means to be ‘integrated’ or to belong to the ‘mainstream’ (Magazzini 2017; Perry 2014), this starting point is hardly surprising. [...]. ‘The marginalized did not create identity politics: their identities have been forced upon them by dominant groups’ (Abrahams 2019)” (2021: 3).

Here a potential venue to achieve this change of categories/concepts that Dahinden proposed, is to borrow from our transatlantic peers, concepts they have developed, such as intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991). Indeed, Dahinden called us to interrogate “in which contexts and structures, these categories are relevant to understanding given phenomena and how they intersect with other categories of differences” (2016, p. 5). We will make the case for an intersectional or gender+ lens in the last subsection of this paper.

Her second proposition is to link migration research issues more closely with social science and theory in general. And indeed, the premise of Re-Place is to move from migration studies, to mobilities studies. How would that work in practice? Amelina (2022) offered a “performativist ‘doing-migration’ approach” which she tied with transnational, multiscalar and decolonial concepts, from multiple standpoints. She argued:

“the doing-migration approach involves studying performative naming strategies around “migration” by actors, organizations or institutions both in the “context of origin” or “context of destination” with regard to the studied populations. In a nutshell, the analytical focus on “doing migration” within the framework of transnational studies means paying attention to the ways in which individuals are migrantised in some settings (usually the receiving contexts) and de- or re-migrantised in others (usually the sending contexts) (cf. Barglowski 2019)” (Amelina, 2022: 10).

Several empirical accounts can be found in the literature, as scholars have long attempted to bring categories of practice into their analytical framework, and this in order to challenge existing categories and concepts. Talleraas (2020) for instance has looked at how bureaucrats understand the category of “transnational individuals” and articulate it with their administrative work. A very interesting finding of her work is that “the bureaucrats shared an institution-wide attitude that cross-border clients were the new norm” (2020: 11), and they included all segments of the population in the transnational group: Norwegians and foreigners, migrants and non-migrants. Yet the variegated informal categories they reported to Talleraas did not translate into existing formal categories and the difficulties to label people meant that their entitlements were not clearly identified by the system. This raises a challenge: even if we manage to move from categories that serve State interests, does it mean that we can offer adaptable recommendations for policymaking?

A last proposition made by Dahinden is “to move away from treating the migrant population as the unit of analysis and investigation and instead direct the focus on parts of the whole population, which obviously includes migrants”. Here this means that research teams could define specific places where the entire population meets, including migrants, as units of research. In that sense, this would permit to put to the test Garcès-Mascreñas and Penninx’s (2016) definition of integration as a 3-way process, where not only migrants but also nationals and institutions have a role in creating an integrated society - nowadays an accepted definition in EU agendas and publications (Magazzini, 2021). In fact, Magazzini challenged the concept of integration in Europe asking: “can we speak about ‘integrated societies’ and of ‘migrant integration’ into these societies, if most democratic European countries display, to a non-negligible degree, some of the features mentioned [...]—homelessness, unemployment, high incarceration rates, rising inequality, or significant groups of the population disengaged from the democratic process and institutional representation?” (2021: 6).

By focusing on 12 LBAs, by proposing to understand the experiences of a wide diversity of residents in these LBAs, and by adopting a mobility lens, the Re-Place consortium has set the base for “demigrantising” their research design, without dismissing the social injustices migrant peoples and minorities might face. In the subsection that follows, we suggest looking at well-being as a potential conceptual tool to assess the degree of “integration” of the overall residents of a place, taking into consideration a wider range of mobilities.

5.3.2 From integration to well-being. A framework for addressing life among diversified (im)mobilities

Re-place emerges from a standpoint within mobilities studies that recognizes the intricate interplay between different forms of mobility and their impacts. Thus, it advocates for an integrated, place-based approach rather than a narrow immigration lens, aiming to foster a comprehensive understanding of community well-being and place-making from a framework that “cultivates” rather than “engineers” human capital of specific places. Indeed, the central argument of the research framework posits that despite their relation, prioritizing well-being over integration provides an innovative framework that encompasses all population groups by mainstreaming the concept of quality of life beyond the exclusivity of migrants and towards the integrated lives of the now “new inhabitants”.

Building upon existing studies within contemporary literature, integration and well-being have often been considered two interrelated concepts. While some studies address the role of integration and interaction in promoting and strengthening well-being from economic and socio-economic perspectives (Headey, Muffels, and Wooden 2008; Layard, 2005), others acknowledge that integration and its deriving improvement of well-being, are not solely dependent on access to money nor “strong ties” with family and friends (Sandstrom and Dunn, 2014). This latest body of literature, situated within human well-being studies, contends that well-being is multidimensional and complex, consisting of both objective and subjective dimensions (Appau et al., 2019). The first dimension focuses on the objective and quantifiable parameters and conditions people have and lack in particular moments of their life and mobility stages (job quality, housing, health, knowledge and skills, work-life balance, civic engagement, social connections, social capital, and place identity/attachment). The second dimension starts from inquiring about perceptions of well-being to building on an understanding of where such perceptions come from as well as each person’s reference system to interpret such perceptions (Diener, 2006).

The work of scholars Katie Wright and Julie McLeod sheds light on the complexities and dualities of human well-being. For instance, they define well-being as “a construct deployed as a measure of a good life. Often associated with physical and mental health, wellbeing encompasses numerous indicators, from subjective experiences of happiness and satisfaction to markers of economic prosperity and basic human needs of security” (2016:1). Within this definition, they, as well as others adopting a well-being approach (See

Gough et al., 2007) highlight the necessity to use well-being as a lens to understand what people value and how far they can achieve their desired lives in the places they settle, by building up and negotiating a net of relations of economic, social, cultural, occupational, and personal dimensions. Within this frame, well-being is composed of at least three interrelated domains. First relational (including intimate relations and broader relationships); second functional (regarding employment and housing among others); and third perceptual (considering emotional dimensions and values). Regardless of the prominence of each dimension, Wright (2012) argues they are constantly negotiated with external factors and more importantly they are more than often negotiated among each other, as a way to achieve the best subjective well-being level for each individual. Wright's contributions are not limited to defining well-being. With equal importance, she delves into understanding how well-being is constructed from the point of view of each person and their interactions. For instance, by exploring Latin American Migrants based in London and Madrid, Wright (2012) argues human well-being is not static, but when concerning differentiated experiences of mobility, it is also constructed translocally and transnationally. This point highlights the capacity of well-being to travel across spatial and scalar boundaries and to be gendered and changed across life cycles and individual perceptions that are collectively informed.

While the individual scale is central to the concept of well-being, such a scale is now largely positioned within contextual influences of community (Atkinson et al., 2020). In other words, well-being is seen to exist as combinations of individual measures that collide in the same place. Consequently, studies have now strongly related the concept of well-being to the notion of place. For instance, some scholars sustain that “well-being, however, defined, can have no form, expression or enhancement without consideration of place” (Atkinson et al., 2016: 3). Under this idea, places cannot be considered static backdrops or containers, for instance, as some qualitative and policy-oriented approaches have done; instead, places must be addressed as naturally relational in both its influence and production (Cresswell, 2004). As a result, places are embedded in webs of interconnection (Massey, 2005) and relate to well-being “as a snapshot of a current state, longitudinally across time or as a projection into the future” (Atkinson et al., 2016: 5). Within this idea, place attachment plays an important role, since intended as long-term affective bonds between individuals and significant places (Giuliani, 2003), increased feeling of security and belonging have the potential to shape individual and collective identities as well as bring about significant improvements in wellbeing (Jack, 2016).

Even if well-being has often been incorporated into more assessable ideas of good life, quality of life, and development (McLeod and Wright, 2016), little is known of how living well and perceiving a subjective well-being actually entails on the ground. Especially considering the changes and redefinitions triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, further research is needed to explore in what ways ideals of wellbeing are built from everyday life and how its perception is built individually and collectively through social relations. Re-Place addresses this gap in the literature by building a grounded and place-based approach to the study of the

relationship between left-behind areas, mobility, and good life from a well-being framework that considers people with and without mobility experiences as entities of a diversified but integrated whole. However, since this approach can potentially offer an important advance in mobility studies, the project recognizes it also represents significant theoretical and methodological challenges that point towards issues of gender, intersectionality, researchers' positionality, and sensitivity towards detailed and subjective descriptions of wellbeing within a wide range of mobilities. The following section addresses such methodological challenges without neglecting the multiple levels of social injustice that migrants might face during and after their mobility experiences.

5.3.3 “De-migrantising” integration through wellbeing in practice

Responding to the challenges presented above in building a well-being framework that serves to de-migrantise integration involves a reflexive methodological design. Drawing from the critical literature presented above there are several questions to take into consideration. How can we produce new knowledge on mobility impacts without being steered by predefined categories that might limit our understanding of individual and collective experiences? How can we build meaningful categories and concepts in our analysis that critically engage with rather than reproduce the migration apparatus? How can we adopt a wellbeing lens rather than an integration lens without creating a blindspot in terms of the multiple levels of social injustice that migrants might face (partial frame)? When developing intersectional categories of practice, how can we make adaptable recommendations for policymaking?

From integration to well-being. In response to the challenges put forth in the previous sections – that there is ‘disintegration’ across society affecting the whole population (not only migrants) and that discourse and practice with regard to integration puts the onus on migrant choice and responsibility – Re-Place focuses on immobile and mobile individuals. Focusing on wellbeing, rather than integration, provides a framework that includes all population groups by mainstreaming quality of life. Re-Place brings this forward in practice through different methods.

First, data has been gathered through a large-scale representative online population survey at the national level in 6 Re-Place countries on how different types of (im)mobile individuals *feel* about the place they live in terms of place identity, attachment and wellbeing. Conducting the survey at the national level rather than in LBAs increases the explanatory capacity of the results, but importantly it focusses on the population as an integrated whole rather than using migrants as a unit of analysis. Addressing functional and emotional wellbeing, place attachment and (im)mobility experiences, the survey mainstreams the idea of quality of life and wellbeing over integration to provide common points of inclusivity in lieu of a narrow immigration lens.

Second, this is given continuity through qualitative fieldwork in 12 LBAs. Initially, expert interviews will gather expert perspectives on both conventional strategies of development (hard infrastructures, innovation and business) and non-conventional aspects of development in line with the project’s focus on valorising the human potential of LBAs. Following expert interviews, the emphasis is on examining the perceptions and livelihood practices of local residents as a whole across life domains. In-depth interviews with stayers, movers and newcomers will enable us to shed light on micro strategies of dealing with peripherality and place-making. This is in line with the goal to foreground local knowledge and experiences of “ordinary” households to promote neo-endogenous development. This is not to say that migration, ethnicity, race and other intersectionalities will not be recognised as categories of difference. However, it means that in epistemic terms when planning and conducting fieldwork, whether interviews with experts, households or participants for village labs and co-production of visual methods, it is essential to keep asking *what positions or locations resist telling and what silences are present?*⁶

Box 7 - working definitions of social incorporation and wellbeing

<p>Academia</p>	<p>Elaborating on the idea that ‘Wellbeing, however defined, can have no form, expression or enhancement without consideration of place.’ (Atkinson et al. (2016), p. 3), and the idea that “A focus on the construction of human wellbeing can potentially provide a more holistic approach to debates on migration” Wright (2010), Re-Place research deploys a framework of wellbeing focused on the relational, material and perceptual domains of people with (im)mobility experiences as complementary lectures to more traditional readings of wellbeing exclusive focused on economic growth. Indeed, objective and subjective measures of wellbeing are considered.</p> <p>The objective dimension of well-being refers to tangible, quantifiable factors such as job quality, housing, health, skills, work-life balance, civic involvement, social ties, social capital, and place identity/attachment. The subjective dimension explores individuals’ perceptions of their well-being (Diener, 2006). Moreover, Re-Place’s use of wellbeing is not limited to socio-economic indicators, but expands to the sense of belonging, and integration into the local territory and social systems of each person (external factors). Consequently, Re-Place does not understand the relationship between social incorporation and wellbeing as a static and defined moment (moment of migration), but as Berg (2020) suggests, searching for and building a condition of wellbeing is a continuous, open and indefinite process that goes beyond the act of moving from one place to another, and extends in time through the daily actions of everyday life.</p>
<p>Public administration / Third sector</p>	<p>Social incorporation and wellbeing within public administration have proven to be multidimensional issues that enact the construction of macroeconomic policies addressing wellbeing from a prosperity approach; from socio-ecological wellbeing (Yates, Dombroski and Dionisio, 2023), among others. Re-Place research adds another innovative lens by first, framing public administrations through their role as agents in the construction of wellbeing for human integration, thus giving humans</p>

	<p>the potential to fulfil their purpose by realizing their capacities in relation with others around (social incorporation) and with the place and environment they inhabit. Second, addressing the role of public administration in the facilitation and mediation of human relations between people with multiple and diverse experiences of mobility, joined together with the common goal of improving their quality of life and social wellbeing at individual and collective levels in an unlimited time frame that comprises life before, during and after mobility.</p>
<p>Private stakeholders</p>	<p>Re-Place research addresses private stakeholders not only as agents of economic wellbeing, but more importantly, as potential generators of social integration and social wellbeing, since they work as platforms that enable the creation of networks of knowledge, human capital, resources, and expertise. Moreover, they act as mediators between the potentialities of non-metropolitan areas and the interest and capacities of migrants, tourists, and other stakeholders. As documented by Eimermann (2016) and Olmedo et al. (2023), some real-life examples highlight how an active role of private stakeholders might potentially result in the construction of immigrants' social networks not only destined to achieve economic growth, but also focused on building integration, social wellbeing, and local governance.</p>

A relational place-mobility approach. Scaling down from the national level analyses described in previous sections (LHDI and the representative survey), the unit of analysis adopted in the second phase of research is place, which involves qualitative and participatory fieldwork in 12 LBAs. Moving away from predefined categories of migration, a place-based approach rests on the assumption that understanding the impacts of mobilities on place and their contribution to place-making cannot be achieved through the study of singular mobility types. A place approach encapsulates the heterogeneous forms of dwelling and diversity that are enmeshed in place for the whole population. As such a broader definition of spatial mobilities is adopted to understand how they cumulatively contribute to transforming the socio-economic fabric, cultural landscape and physical environment of LBAs.

The construction of mobility profile reports and qualitative interviews with local experts in our 12 non-metropolitan case study areas recognises place as a “constellation of processes” (2005: 107). Drawing on secondary data and data gathered through Re-Place’s representative population survey and mapping of mobility infrastructures, the mobility profiles will be enriched with data collected through stakeholder interviews which will help shed light on spatial pioneers, the history of flows, development of specific migration corridors, community formation, transnational links. Plotting the spatial articulations between places in spatial mobility flows and between spatial mobility flows that intersect in place foregrounds a relational comparison at the local level to help understand places “through each other” (Ward, 2010). A relational approach means examining not only place-based experiences with local (im)mobile households, but also their family webs, livelihood strategies and social networks, which may be multi-locational or circular as well as understanding the experiences of those who have left.

5.4 Harnessing local expertise of communities in LBAs: Methodological innovations

Amandine Desille

5.4.1 Mediated mobilities in LBAs

The Re-Place project seeks to advance the methodological toolbox available to researchers carrying out research in i) LBAs, or in regions facing similar challenges such as non-metropolitan areas, shrinking areas, Small and Mid-sized Towns and Rural Areas (SMTaRA), peripheral areas, border zones, and the like; and ii) with people on the move, people who have experienced migration, people forcibly (im)mobile, and the like. Aside from more traditional research methods, such as interviews, three proposals were made to positively engage with people who have a connection with the selected LBAs: the *curation of visuals*; *Village Labs*; and a *policy toolbox*. Each of these instruments foresees a high level of participation of actors in the field, and this with the objective to enhance impact on well-being, place attachment and neo-endogenous development in LBAs. In this sense, the development-mobility nexus in LBAs is seen as “mediated” by a variety of actors way beyond the Re-Place consortium.

Media is defined as the “intervening substance in which sensory impressions are conveyed”. In this sense, the notion of mediation here is highly related to the (re)production of stories, narratives on what bodies live and sense. When it comes to conveying people’s experiences of mobilities in/from LBAs, the most obvious producer of texts and images we think of is the Media themselves. In the field of international migration, and more substantially since 2015, the media has been crucial in shaping the story/narrative of the “migration crisis” (Chouliaraki & Stolic, 2017), and in pushing forward polarised military-humanitarian visual politics of operations in the Mediterranean Sea (Musarò, 2017; Franko, 2021). As Moralli et al. affirmed, “we are witnessing an increase in securitarian representations (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2018) characterised by the dehumanisation of migrant people and their representation as a radical threat to internal security, values, and identity.” (2023: S831). In her works pre-dating the so-called crisis, Ahmed had already foreseen the role of texts and images in generating emotions, and governing/framing migration and race politics (Ahmed, 2004; Ahmed, 2014).

The same is said of non-metropolitan areas, as: “peripheral areas are also described in a distorted way. Marginalised regions are very often invisible in mainstream narratives or presented as places of immobility and lack (Carrosio, 2019).” What we witness to, is a “double mediatic uncritical approach” which “contributes to underrepresenting the presence of people on the move in peripheral areas, but it also reduces its complex narrative into simple dichotomies and distorted images that have an effect on welcoming processes” (Moralli et al. 2023).

Mainstream media are not the only actors producing a narrative on mobilities or on LBAs. As Silva and Gordon have argued in their seminal work *Net locality: Why location matters in a networked world* (2011),

“we used to talk about the World Wide Web as an interconnected information space set aside from the world we live in, but the world we live in and the web can no longer be so easily separated” (2011: 1). Buhr, Desille and Fonseca (2024) have already looked at the role ICTs in shaping the city, and shaping the use of the city by migrant individuals. We have shown that migrants, as well as other residents, heavily rely on mediated information on the city to use its services and opportunities, but that they also shape back information by providing feedback on the Internet, notably through social media. Moreover, we showed the extent to which mediated data is profoundly local. In this, we rallied to Silva and Gordon’s argument that “Net locality is, indeed, a global phenomenon, but it needs to be considered locally. How specific cultures appropriate technologies, adapt social practices, and produce cultural references, are going to influence the meanings of location” (e Silva and Gordon, 2011: 15).

This has translated in new methodological approaches in measuring happiness, well-being, and quality of life, including in non-metropolitan contexts. Mitchell et al. (2013) and Zivanovic et al. (2020), based on a technique developed by Dodds and Danforth (2009), have used Twitter-based geolocated data (tweets) to map and correlate happiness and quality of life, with place. Mitchell et al. “examine how individual word usage correlates with happiness and various social and economic factors” (2013: 2). Those “words” tell place-based stories. Similarly, alternative texts in social media are subjected to scrutiny, such as images in Instagram. Baumann et al. (2017), Riboldi (2018) and Feijó et al. (2018) have constituted samples of Instagram images to sketch a visual imaginary of Lisbon, either by users or by tourism practitioners. In that sense, this emerging body of research looks at the ways the online and the offline imaginaries of the city are brought together. However, when it comes to LBAs, Sanderson (2023) has looked at their social media representation: the result is that left-behindness is often synonymous of invisibility.

5.4.2 Coproduction of a collective “archive”

To counter the biases we have mentioned hereinabove, research projects ought to participate in bringing forward alternative texts, and “counter-hegemonic imaginaries capable of challenging media misrepresentation supported by some outlets and anti-migration political discourse (Smets et al., 2019).” (Moralli et al. 2023). In a chapter published three years ago, we wrote: “We aimed at inventing new ways to represent migrants and their trajectories, while attempting to escape the violence of the biographic injunction one undergoes through administrative procedures for the migrants’ “treatment” (residency, asylum, children rights). Indeed, these procedures challenge the migrants’ stories while demanding they tell “coherent” and complete stories” (Bacon, Desille and Pate, 2021). We relied on Béliard and Eideliman (2008) to name “living archives” a series of multimedia productions on migration experiences in Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, France, Belgium, Greece, etc. that is archives “which do not only reveal precious scenes and materials, but also represent objects to be analysed” (Bacon et al. 2021). We argued further that “reversing representations aims at transforming the collective sight upon migrants” (ibid.). The creation of an archive is not straightforward. If Margaret Mead had dreamt of harnessing the potential of the camera

as a “microscope”, replicating laboratory settings (1977), it has become clear with the years that we cannot argue our way towards the objectivity of the camera. The relations between the filming body, the camera and the filmed bodies mean that producing visual is a subjective matter. Yet, as Ahmed proposed when she assembled her own archive,

“To name one’s archive is a perilous matter; it can suggest that these texts ‘belong’ together, and that the belonging is a mark of one’s own presence. What I offer is a model of the archive not as the conversion of self into a textual gathering, but as a ‘contact zone’. An archive is an effect of multiple forms of contact, including institutional forms of contact (with libraries, books, web sites), as well as everyday forms of contact (with friends, families, others)” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 14).

Much as Ahmed, we propose to constitute a collective archive, both with researcher-generated images and with participant-generated images, during the time of the project. The understanding of archive-making as a contact zone means that we ought to make explicit the relations we and participants in the Re-Place project have with the signifiers in these images. The archive will be made available on a regular basis through Instagram publications; and in the longer run with the co-production of a Web documentary at the end of the project. Both these means enable textual contextualisation beyond the images.

We therefore propose to elaborate collective guidelines for the constitution of this archive, and its interpretation as a *contact zone*: i) adopt “dignity” as a method; ii) associate migration with desire, knowledge, dreams and emancipation, instead of misery, poverty, ignorance and war; iii) accept fragmented stories; and iv) acknowledge that absence can be powerful.

Dignity as a method. It may seem commonplace now, but the participation of people on the move, people who have experienced migration, and people forcibly (im)mobile in scientific-artistic projects induce the recognition of their expertise and their agency over their movements (albeit amidst often constraining structures). This contributes to the deconstruction of dominant discourses. With Bacon et al. (2021), we have argued that parental or spousal consent increasingly required by ethical committees (or implicitly understood as a rule of conduct by researchers) is a symbolic reminder of the perception of passivity of people on the move. Instead, including residents of LBAs as co-producers of knowledge may prove very powerful. Several researchers in Re-Place have experienced migration or mobility, yet their trajectory may not be representative of others. “In the particular field of international migration, this type of participatory processes has the potential to allow individuals to build an active relationship to citizenship, to confer agency upon them, and to allow them to overcome their post-political condition (Salzbrunn, Dellwo, and Besençon, 2018). This active participation is a form of “citizenship from below” (Pereira et al., 2016). Some accounts of visual methods emphasise the empowering character of this type of research. The lexicon of “pride” is recurrent in empirical research results.” (Desille and Nikielska-Sekula, 2021: 87). By letting participants choose what they wish to talk about, they can decide if to reenact the type of experiences they

have encountered, including trauma, poverty or insecurity, and how (Weber, 2017; Augustova, 2021). This is why, we propose to adopt “dignity” as a method to collect or co-produce, code, analyse and interpret images (Desille and Nikielska-Sekula, in progress).

“Associate migration with desire, knowledge, dreams and emancipation, instead of misery, poverty, ignorance and war” (Bacon et al. 2021). Lynda Mannik (2012) argues that after WWII, representations of refugees stabilize and reach a consensus of “what a refugee looks like” (crisis, “flood” like metaphors, portraying pity, visually be marked as ‘wounded’ in order to legitimize their refugee status ...). She proposes to “interrogate these well-understood conventions about ‘imagined refugees’ by examining photographs actually produced by [Manivald Sein] while he was experiencing forced migration” in 1948. The images from Sein’s archive are of youngsters smiling to the camera, on the boat to North America. While we do not mean to deny the traumatic experiences leading to migration in the first place, we propose that migration experiences are not reduced to these traumas. The same goes with the stabilized representations of non-metropolitan areas. The rural/urban visual bias we carry can replicate negative perceptions of non-metropolitan areas:

we make choices of long or short frames, still or moving images, which reproduce a romantic idea of the authentic countryside and its counterpart, the busy city, even though the same actors pass through them. In the rural spaces we have crossed, we have tried to represent feelings of emptiness and absence which kind of strengthen (maybe disproportionately) the need to leave and find life in bigger cities (Desille and Nikielska-Sekula, 2023).

Fragmented stories are valid. Following up on dignity as a guideline to our visual curation, and based on Paul Ricoeur’s work (1983), we posit that a story does not need to be coherent to be seen as “acceptable”: narrative visual fragments are instead “true iconographic breakaways: a way of telling one’s story by circumventing the violence of the narrative injunction” (Bacon et al. 2021). In her essay on the biographical condition, Delory-Momberger (2009) showed that we live in an era of biographical injunction, where we ought to be able to speak of ourselves. Yet, narrative fragments instead of biographical performance can be a powerful resistance to this injunction. Moreover, speaking of oneself is hardly free from collective narrative patterns, since much as our references, representational system and visual culture are anchored in specific spaces and cultures (what we often call the ‘gaze’, see Desille and Nikielska-Sekula, 2023). Preventing ourselves from imposing certain ways to tell stories, to show stories visually, is a way to recognize diversity of viewpoints, as much as it “values the knowledge put forth by people as a vital source of expertise” (Wang & Burris, 1997).

Absence can be powerful. The 2015 migration governance crisis in Europe has produced sensational visuals, but not only. Occasionally, projects have focused on landscapes, infrastructures and objects without people, “against the great spectacle of migration and collective amnesia” (Bacon et al. 2021). As

examples, we think of the film *Blue Sky From Pain* (Laurence Pillant and Stéphane Mangriotis, 2016), or the exhibition *Ceux qui passent, ceux qui restent* (Julien Saison and Mathilde Pette). Others have focused on another industry in migration reception areas (such as *Once, the sea was covered with water*, by Lorenzo Sibiriu and Giacomo Orsini (2016) or *The people behind the scenes*, by Elsa Gomis, (2020). In both cases, “Suggestion and interpellation are presented as an alternative to provoking, sensational, which enable the audience to be reflexive and critical” (Bacon et al. 2021). Another choice is to film/photograph with no intention of showing. Nikielska-Sekula (2021) has produced an immense archive of images with and without persons in Norway and Turkey which she uses for analysis only.

In sum, the curation of visuals in the context of Re-Place is apprehended following principles of ethics, subversion, participation, and equalization of knowledge. The same goes for the two other methods we will adopt.

5.4.3 Village Labs and Policy Toolbox

A second and third methodological innovation the project brings forward is the organisation of Village Labs in the 12 selected LBAs, and the co-creation of policies. As promised in the Re-Place proposal, “through participation, participants’ knowledge, experience and visions will be mobilized to co- create innovative policies on local development and well-being”. We expect several policy areas to be covered: “place-sensitive policy on promoting alternative local development to the benefit of all residents across a mobility continuum from temporary, through permanent to long-term stayers and including diverse mobility motivations (labour, retirement, return, etc.); building human capital outcomes and overcoming brain drain and labour exploitation; changing narratives and place identities to embrace diversity and local capacities; smart solutions to harness the benefits of digitization for different local target groups across mobility types and from an intersectional perspective” (see Re-Place proposal).

As such, the implementation of Village Labs, and the resulting policy toolbox it might create largely relies on MacKinnon et al. (2022)’s assumption that neo-endogenous development will come from the potential of local areas to shape their future. For instance, Pain (2019) looked at a former pit village in County Durham in Northeast England, suffering from what she called “chronic urban trauma”. “In policy terms, Pain suggests that top-down interventions can no longer be done to these places, but economic, social and psychological recovery must be generated from the social networks and support already there among residents” (Pain, 2019, cited by MacKinnon et al. 2022).

But which residents? Too often, policymakers in LBAs are not representative of the diversity of their inhabitants. Drawing on transformative, feminist, and/or indigenous policymaking, Re-Place trusts that a greater inclusion of a diversity of residents will have positive impact on local policies. Hass defines feminist policy agenda mainly in terms of “feminist legislation” which “seeks to eliminate all forms of economic,

political, social and cultural inequalities between women and men. It thus seeks women's full and equitable incorporation as citizens" (2006). Here too, the idea is to think of LBAs residents in terms of full (even if not formal) citizenship.

We have already cited a few works which reinforce the positive effects of a "citizenship from below" approach (Salzbrunn, Dellwo, and Besençon, 2018; Pereira et al., 2016). The inclusion of a wider diversity of residents – following gender identity, age, level of education, ethnic and racial self-identification, migration experience, sexual orientation, and more - has the potential to "identify, uproot and transform power relations" (Tant & Jiménez Thomas Rodriguez, 2022) present in local policymaking, and to engage residents. In the UK context again, the OCSI (2019) has shown that "civic assets, connectedness and an engaged community are key building blocks to unite communities, and may reinforce the stake people feel they have in the country's political and economic future". In that sense, engaging the community might trigger a virtuous circle among residents.

Crenshaw's work (1991) on intersectionality stemmed from a court case in the USA, for which the persons who ruled could not identify with the case. Oftentimes, because of their privileged standpoint, decision-makers cannot identify with the problem and change things. Or when they are convinced by the existing problem, the solution is often falling short of the needs of the target group. Participatory methodologies might not be enough if the participants do not properly represent the wide array of groups and vulnerabilities potentially encountered, or worse if someone in the location "resists telling" (see section 5.3.3). In fact, as researchers, we oftentimes choose where to do fieldwork assuming that a certain place becomes a "variable" to our project. In our case here, we put to the test mobilities and neo-endogenous development in place-variables we have called LBAs. We might arrive at the selected place of research without previous "lived" knowledge and practice, and with little social networks. We also bring with us our own knowledge capital, and our own systems. We may rely on a few key persons to start asking questions or to get a sense of what to observe. Because of this well-known qualitative research process, we can resist telling, or our key informants can become gatekeepers and resist telling (Jérôme, 2008). This is why, with the Re-Place project, we have proposed a few innovative methodologies, including visual collaborative methods, and Village Labs. Instead of epistemic privilege, we propose to adopt a posture of "systemic openness" where we build capacities to produce and share knowledge (instead of bringing LBAs residents to mainstream channels), where we learn and imagine alternative futures together, and federate knowledge. Here, the diversity of stakeholders involved in the process is crucial, and we should aim at including actors and collectives often side-lined in research and policy processes. This should prevent ascribing vulnerabilities or left-behindness and reproducing categories of exclusion (see Barasci, 2018).

In sum, the first phases of fieldwork in the 12 selected LBAs will enable the identification of a wider range of diverse stakeholders, to whom Re-Place members can extend an invitation for the Village Labs. The

Village Labs will be moderated in a way that encourage horizontality, rather than replicating the hierarchy of normative expert knowledge over a polyphonic local expertise. Guiding principles will be reiterated in Re-Place methodological documents. The policy toolbox’s preparation is scheduled towards the end of the project in order to include the results of interviews and participatory tools, not as mere illustration but as recommendations in their own rights.

Box 8 - working definition of village labs

<p>Academia</p>	<p>The concept of Village Labs is an innovation of the Re-Place project. It is inspired by the concepts of Urban Living Labs (Petrescu et al. 2022; Steen and Van Buren, 2017), City Labs (Scholl and Kemp, 2016), and Smart Rural Living Labs (Hanninger, Laxa and Ahrens, 2021; Kronsell & Mukhtar-Landgren, 2018; Zavrtnik, Superina and Stojmenova Duh, 2019). As many authors point out, the concept of Living Labs, rooted in Mitchell’s living labs for smart homes (1995), does not answer one definition. A review of the literature points to a few core principles: a) it is user-centred; b) it aims at fostering learning environments and innovation, through knowledge exchange and experimentation in real-life contexts; c) it relies on a multistakeholder approach, with a variety of actors having decision-making power (but relying on the crucial and central role of municipalities); d) it follows the principle of co-creation and collaboration; e) it aims at tapping on a multidisciplinary knowledge ecosystem, where expert as much as experienced knowledge are recognised; f) it is an hybrid organisational form situated between municipalities and society. The most inclusive definition is the one put forth by Westerlund et al. (2018) https://timreview.ca/article/1205 defining Living Lab as “a sociotechnical platform with shared resources, a collaboration framework, and real-life context, which organizes its stakeholders into an innovation ecosystem that relies on representative governance, open standards, and diverse activities and methods to gather, create, communicate, and deliver new knowledge, validated solutions, professional development and social impact” (pp. 56–57). It is important to highlight that the scholarship underlines two main issues affecting Living Labs: social inclusion and upscaling (Da Schio et al. 2018). In the case of the Village Labs developed by Re-Place, which will take place in rural areas, and with people who have experienced migration, it is important to acknowledge “that diverse forms of knowledge are generated in social networks that go beyond traditional “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1992) or planning policy actors (Healey, 2007)” (in Petrescu et al. 2022). For instance, the analysis of projects with migrants and refugees such as the U-RLP Utrecht Refugee Launch Pad https://www.uia-initiative.eu/en/uia-cities/utrecht studied by Dekker et al. (2021) show the difficulty in equalising agency and dealing with time constraints. For the second issue, the lack of resources and the problem of sustainability and international network participation may be particularly salient in LBAs.</p>
<p>Public administration / Third sector</p>	<p>The 2006 funded European Network of Living Labs (ENoLL) defines Living Labs as “real-life test and experimentation environments that foster co-creation and open innovation among the main actors of the Quadruple Helix Model, namely: Citizens; Government; Industry and Academia” (https://enoll.org/about-us/).</p>

<p>Private stakeholders</p>	<p>Few private stakeholders engage in Small Rural Labs by themselves. Yet, in Hanninger et al. (2021), review of digitisation projects in German rural areas through living labs which they define as “living labs, which means that development, implementation and testing takes place within the pilot communities, i.e. in real life. This is done through the bottom-up approach, in which concepts are developed and mutually created in direct dialogue with the citizens: a methodology which is known as co-creation”.</p>
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6
Conclusion

6. Conclusion

Amandine Desille

Left-behind areas (LBAs) represent a complex landscape of economic, social, and demographic challenges, ranging from former industrial areas to rural communities. The dual challenge they face encompasses not only economic deprivation but also social, communal, and cultural decline. Scholars agree upon the relational character of the decline/stagnation of LBAs' economic and social lives in comparison with better-off areas, contributing to what Rodriguez-Pose (2018) described as "geographies of discontent." This discontent, explained either in cultural and economic terms, defies simple categorisation, with varied expressions across different contexts.

While the term "left behind" is often associated with the UK and its "levelling up" policy, understandings of spatial disparities have gained prominence in European national discourses, and in EU institutions. This indicates a broader recognition of the issues faced by LBAs beyond the UK context. The challenge of identifying and defining left-behind areas (LBAs) stems from their multidimensional nature, which varies across national and regional contexts, as well as over time. Factors such as the intensity and duration of decline or stagnation, along with the diverse ways in which communities express discontent, further complicate this task. While efforts like Velthuis et al.'s attempt to categorize the diversity within the LBA label (2023b), and initiatives by research consortia (see for instance Schiller et al. 2022) to understand welcoming processes for migrants in such areas, provide valuable insights, there remains no clear-cut method for identifying LBAs. In terms of political agenda, LBAs often find themselves overshadowed by big urban centres in the context of city competitiveness and the skill economy. This leaves them with the options of either "catching up" or managing decline, both of which are prone to instrumentalisation by central administrations. This often manifests as "left-behind sloganism," reinforcing stigmatization rather than addressing underlying issues.

Despite these challenges, Re-Place builds on the literature on "left-behindness" due to its acknowledgment (and critique) that LBAs do not exist in a political vacuum; rather, they result from relational uneven development. Beyond this more critical stance, the literature also emphasises alternative futures that prioritise community agency over top-down approaches. By re-establishing the importance of belonging, place attachment, and social infrastructures, the term "left-behind" underscores the need for holistic, community-centric solutions to address the complex challenges faced by these areas.

One of the distinctive contributions of Re-Place lies in its multidisciplinary approach to understanding the geographical, mobility, socio-economic, and psycho-social dimensions of LBAs. Regarding the way mobility has been conceptualised in relation to LBAs, we draw from the migration-development nexus, transnationalism, the mobility paradigm, and the "spatial turn," to offer a fresh perspective on the role of

various forms of movement in these areas. By considering not only the economic contribution of people who have experienced migration, but also their experiences, social and cultural contributions etc.; and emphasising collaboration between local and international actors, Re-Place recognises the complexity of mobilities in place. Importantly, the project reframes immobility and mobility as interconnected phenomena, challenging the notion that one is inherently positive while the other is negative. This perspective is particularly relevant in the post-pandemic era, as COVID-19 has exacerbated existing inequalities in (im)mobilities. By fostering dialogue and debate on these issues, Re-Place seeks to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of mobility patterns and their implications for community-based and asset-based development in LBAs.

Within Re-Place, a place-based approach to neo-endogenous development renews focus on (im)mobilities, placing particular emphasis on the concept of place attachment. While place attachment has been extensively studied, its relationship with (im)mobilities and well-being remains under-explored. Recognising place attachment as multidimensional and multiscalar, the project highlights its potential to enhance community cohesion and bolster social infrastructure in LBAs. By understanding how place attachment intersects with (im)mobilities and well-being, Re-Place aims to identify the "missing link" that can reignite community-building processes beyond mere economic growth. This perspective suggests that strengthening place attachment may serve as a catalyst for addressing discontent in LBAs, particularly where community cohesion and social infrastructure are lacking.

Against this backdrop, Re-Place will undertake a comprehensive examination of (im)mobilities, well-being, neo-endogenous development, participation, and gender+ intersectionality within LBAs across six European countries: Germany, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. This ambitious endeavour will involve innovative conceptual and methodological developments conducted in a multidisciplinary manner.

The Re-Place project will explore the impact of (im)mobilities on locations by examining various types of mobility and their interactions. Rather than focusing solely on specific types of mobility, *our project will delve into the diverse and evolving forms of dwelling intricately intertwined with the concept of place.* We aim to address immobility and mobility because we aim at "demigrantisation" and at overcoming the sedentary bias. As we will embark on qualitative fieldwork, we propose to analyse multiple types of (im)mobilities and their intersections with inequalities related to gender, disability, age, ethnicity, nationality, migration status, religion, sexual orientation, and economic status. To achieve a deeper comprehension of spatial (im)mobilities, particularly in areas that have been labelled as "left-behind" we recognise the importance of moving away from city centrism and embracing place-based policymaking. Since place is not bound, *our project will examine interconnections through a comparative relational method that considers translocal contexts.*

To comprehensively understand left-behindness and (im)mobilities, as well as to equip policymakers with the necessary tools, Re-Place employs a mixed-methods research approach. This approach allows for a holistic exploration of complex phenomena, combining qualitative and quantitative tools. A first aspect of the project involves developing an indicator of human development aimed at advancing nuanced understandings of development pathways and mobility in areas which could be identified as “left-behind”. *The Local Human Development Indicator (LHDI), crafted by the Re-Place consortium, is tailored to articulate data at the local level, focusing on community capitals beyond traditional economic growth-related metrics.* The LHDI addresses several shortcomings present in existing indicators. Firstly, it measures local human development rather than relying solely on national or regional data, providing a more granular understanding of community well-being. Secondly, it goes beyond conventional health, knowledge, and income dimensions to encompass a broader range of assets, thus offering a more comprehensive view of development (rather than a simple show of disparities). In addition to desk-based data collection, Re-Place acknowledges the role of mobilities, both outgoing and incoming, as drivers of development rather than mere consequences; and it adopts a historical approach to consider decline over time, allowing for the selection of areas for focused study. Furthermore, the project prioritizes gender analysis, recognizing the importance of gender-sensitive approaches in understanding and addressing disparities within LBAs and mobility patterns.

Re-Place conducts a large-scale representative online population survey across the six countries involved in the project. This survey measures residents' subjective perceptions of place attachment, well-being, and mobility-based development. By addressing functional and emotional well-being, along with place attachment and (im)mobility experiences, the survey aims to mainstream the idea of quality of life and well-being over integration. This approach ensures inclusivity, providing common points of reference to understand and address disparities within LBAs and mobility patterns, without solely focusing on immigration-related issues. *Transitioning from a focus on integration to one centred on well-being, we propose a lens to comprehend what individuals value and their ability to achieve desired lives in the places they inhabit.* Well-being is recognised as a combination of individual measures converging in the same place. It entails building and negotiating a network of economic, social, cultural, occupational, and personal relations. Consequently, recent studies have increasingly linked well-being to the notion of place, acknowledging the influence of local contexts on individuals' well-being. What we argue is that further research is necessary to explore how ideals of well-being are constructed from everyday life experiences and how perceptions of well-being are shaped both individually and collectively through social relations. Re-Place seeks to address this gap by developing a grounded, place-based approach to examining the relationship between left-behind areas, mobility, and good life within a framework of well-being. By considering individuals with and without mobility experiences as integral components of a diversified yet integrated whole, we observe the dynamics at play in LBAs and their impact on individuals' well-being.

The quantitative methods also enable the selection of 12 particular areas for fieldwork. During this phase, the relational character of place is reiterated: the construction of mobility profile reports and qualitative interviews with local experts in our 12 non-metropolitan case study areas recognizes place as a "constellation of processes" (2005: 107). Stakeholder interviews will shed light on spatial pioneers, migration corridors, community formation, and transnational links, helping us understand places "through each other" (Ward, 2010).

During fieldwork, Re-Place will employ agency-sensitive methods such as participatory mapping and network analysis with LBAs' residing households, considering multilocational and circular mobilities. It will also conduct in-depth interviews with mobile households, both those moving in and out of LBAs, as well as immobile households. Digital ethnography will be utilised to create a collective "archive" of images, grounded in local experiences and guided by principles of ethics, subversion, participation, and equalisation of knowledge. Furthermore, Village Labs will serve as platforms for co-creating innovative policies.

These initiatives should enable *the creation of alternative narratives on LBAs*, with the aim to overcome the invisibilisation, dehumanisation, and securitisation of certain forms of mobilities, and the stigmatisation of LBAs. From a scholarly point of view, we have already explained the interest of addressing the various issues abovementioned through a "left-behind" lens, yet Re-Place seeks to co-produce knowledge about these areas without imposing the conceptual framework of left-behindness. To do so, images will be generated not only by researchers, but in co-production with participants to create a visual archive. The understanding of archive-making as a "contact zone" (Ahmed, 2004) means that we ought to investigate the relations we and participants in the Re-Place project have with the signifiers in these images, challenging epistemic privilege. The archive will be regularly shared through Instagram publications and culminate in the co-production of a web documentary, enabling textual contextualization beyond the images.

Overall, we believe that this working paper not only provides a conceptual "compass" for the extensive research team involved with Re-Place, but can also serve to open a discussion with fellow scholars, as well as policymakers and practitioners on the variegated challenges met in LBAs across Europe, in an era of mobility.

7
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